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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
Plaintiffs/Appellants' motion for new trial was denied on May 30, 2007. (R.11372-
11377 [Addendum 17].) Appellants filed their notice of appeal on June 26, 2007. 
(R.11387-11388 [Addendum 80].) Final judgment was filed on July 3, 2007. (R.11395 
[Addendum 2].) This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to section 78-2-2 (3)(j) and 4, Utah 
Code. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court err by denying appellants' motion for new trial based on 
an irregularity in the proceedings? Standard of Review: In reviewing a denial of a 
motion for new trial, an abuse of discretion standard applies. Smith v. Fairfax Realty, 
Inc., 2003 UT 41, P25 [82 P.3d 1064] (Utah 2003). 
2. Was it error for the trial court to exclude impeachment evidence that Mr. 
Tiede, Ford's engineer, found the Clayton door latch in a fully open position? Standard of 
Review: Where facts are not in dispute, a trial court's decision to exclude evidence is a 
question of law. See, State v. Ramirez 817 P.2d 774, 781-782 n.3 (Utah 1991); Provo 
City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 
1270 n.ll (Utah 1993). 
3. Did Ford5 s special jury verdict form mislead the jury as a matter of law? 
Standard of Review: The use of special verdict interrogatories is within the trial court's 
discretion, see, Cambeltlnfl Corp, v. Dalton, 745 P.2d 1239, 1241 (Utah 1987), but the 
special verdict form cannot mislead the jury or erroneously state the law. Summerill v. 
Shipley, 890 P.2d 1042, 1044 (Utah Ct App. 1995). 
1 
4. Was it error for the trial court to give Instructions Nos. 27, 30 and 31? 
Standard of Review: Rulings concerning jury instructions are reviewed for correctness. 
See Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Ca, 918 P.2d 461, 466 (Utah 1996). Jury instructions 
are prejudicial when they misadvise the jury on the law. Butler v. Naylor, 1999 UT 85, 
P10 [987 P.2d 41] (Utah 1999). Error is reviewed by evaluating the entirety of jury 
instructions. Ames v. Maas, 846 P.2d 468, 471 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
5. Was it error for the trial court to bifurcate the trial? Standard of Review: 
Absent prejudice, a trial court has discretion in ordering a trial on separate issues. See, 
Slusher v. Ospital, 111 P.2d 437, 441 (Utah 1989); Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr. v. 
Smith's Food & Drug Ctrs., 889 P.2d 445, 462 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
6. Did the trial court err by excluding many of Ford's own engineering 
documents and memoranda pertaining to the Explorer's design and prototype testing? 
Standard of Review: A trial court's decision to exclude evidence is a question of law 
where underlying facts are not in dispute. State v. Ramirez, supra, 817 P.2d 774, 781-782 
n.3. 
7. Did the trial court err in directing a verdict in Ford's favor on the 
marketing/fraud issue? Standard of Review: A directed verdict requires that no question 
of material fact exist. Nay v. General Motors Corp., GMC Truck Div., 850 P.2d 1260, 
1261, 1264 (Utah 1993). 
8. Did the trial court's actions and remarks coerce a quick and unreasoned jury 
verdict? Standard of Review: A trial court's case management is reviewed under an 
2 
abuse of discretion standard. Berrett v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., Inc., 830 P.2d 
291, 293 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
9. Did the trial court err by failing to dismiss or further inquire of Juror No. 3 
about his expressed inability to remain impartial? Standard of Review: To prevail on a 
claim of failing to remove a juror, a party must demonstrate prejudice. State v. Menzies, 
889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 1994). 
10. Did the trial court err when it permitted Ford to present statistical evidence 
of other rollover accidents? Standard of Review: A trial court's decision to admit 
evidence is a question of law where the underlying facts are not in dispute. State v. 
Ramirez, supra, 817 P.2d 774, 781-782 n.3. 
11. Was it error for the trial court to allow Ford to elicit expert opinion 
testimony on causation from Trooper Pace? Standard of Review: A trial court's decision 
to admit evidence is a question of law where the underlying facts are not in dispute. State 
v. Ramirez, supra, 817 P.2d 774, 781-82 n.3. 
12. Should the judgment be reversed based on cumulative error? Standard of 
Review: Reversal is required where the effect of several errors undermine confidence in 
the trial. Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920, 928 (Utah 1990). 
APPLICABLE RULES AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following rules and statutory provisions are relevant to this appeal: 
1. Utah R. Civ. P. 26 (a)(3), 42, 47(a), 47(f)(1), 47 (f)(6), 59 (a)(1), 59 (a)(7). 
2. Utah R. Evid., 401, 403, 602, 608 (c), 701, 702, 803 (8) (C). 
3. UCA 78-24-1. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from a six-week complex design defect product liability trial 
involving a 1997 Ford Explorer. On November 27, 1998, Tony Clayton was driving the 
SUV when a single vehicle rollover ensued. He was ejected through the open driver's 
door ahead of the Explorer and died. Kellie Montoya, Tony's fiancee, and front seat 
passenger, survived the rollover but she suffered a debilitating brain injury. 
On November 22, 2000, appellants, Fred and Dolores Clayton, individually, and 
on behalf of the Estate of Anthony Clayton, filed a law suit against Ford Motor Company. 
(R. 1-7.) Appellant, Kellie Montoya subsequently filed separate suit. Ms. Montoya's suit 
was later consolidated in April 14, 2003. (R. 442.) Thereafter, on September 30, 2003, 
appellants filed a first amended complaint alleging wrongful death, strict liability, 
negligence, failure to warn, breach of express and implied warranty, negligent infliction 
of emotional distress, violation of consumer sales act,1/ fraud and pleaded punitive 
damages. (R. 717-735 [Addendum 1].) 
Prior to trial, the court granted Ford's bifurcation motion. Several pretrial motions 
were heard and granted, granted in part, or denied.2/ (R. 9582-9595 [Addendum 21].) 
Jury trial began on January 2, 2007. (R. 9606.) After the close of appellants' case-in-
chief, Ford moved for partial directed verdicts on several defect allegations (R. 10041-
10172), which the court granted in part. (R. 10241.) 
1
 This cause was later dismissed during summary judgment proceedings. 
2
 Appellants will address the trial court's decisions and the resulting prejudice in 
the arguments as they are relevant to specific issues. 
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At the close of Ford's evidence on February 8, 2007, appellants moved for a partial 
directed verdict, which the court denied. (R. 10385-10391; R. 10394-10395.) Appellants 
submitted their proposed special verdict form on February 8, 2008, at the unreported jury 
instruction conference. (R. 10377-10383 [Addendum71]; see also R. 10395.) Ford also 
submitted its special verdict form on February 8, 2008. (R. 10510-10513 [Addendum 
72].) The district court rejected both forms. The following morning, in chambers, 
appellants submitted a revised special verdict form. [Addendum 73.] Ford also proposed a 
revised special verdict form. (R. 10608-10610 [Addendum 74].) Ford's form was given 
over appellants' objections. (R. 11483, R.T. 2/9/07, p.m., pp. 116-117 [Addendum 12].) 
Jury instruction Nos. 27, 30 and 31 [Addendum 75] were also given over appellants' 
objections. (R. 11483, pp. 116-117 [Addendum 12].) 
Closing arguments began the morning of Friday, February 9, 2007. The jury heard 
closing arguments for several hours without a lunch break. At 3:30 p.m., the jury was 
sequestered. At about 7:00 p.m., the jury was given a pizza. At about 9:30 p.m., a 6-2 
verdict in favor of Ford was read.3/ (R. 10551-10552.) 
Appellants moved for a new trial arguing several points of legal error. (R. 10949-
11022; R. 11226-11228 [Addendums 50, 51].) At oral argument, Ford's counsel made 
factual misrepresentations about appellants' door latch engineer's inspection of the 
Explorer. By ex parte application, appellants immediately submitted a rebuttal affidavit of 
3
 The jury was rushed out of the courtroom, but one juror returned and reported 
that the jury's verdict was not unanimous, but 6-2. The judge subsequently advised 
counsel and struck the word "unanimous" from the final judgment entered. (R. 11395, 
11396 [Addendum 2].) 
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Andrew Gilberg (R. 11363-11365 [Addendum 53], which the court rejected by separate 
order. (R. 11370 [Addendum 54].) 
The court thereafter denied appellants' new trial motion (R.11372-11375 
[Addendum 17]) and entered final judgment. (R.11395-11396 [Addendum 2].) Appellants 
timely filed a notice of appeal. (R.11387-11388 [Addendum 80.) Ford filed a notice of 
cross-appeal. (R. 11397-11399.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 27, 1998, Tony Clayton was driving his 1997 Ford Explorer with his 
fiancee Kellie Montoya. The couple were traveling east on 1-80 about four miles from 
Evanston, Wyoming, when the SUV suddenly veered out of control. There was no 
inclement weather; the visibility was clear and the pavement was dry. Tony was driving 
the posted speed limit. (R. 11461 R.T. 1/17/07, p. 51 [Addendum 3].) 
Just before the rollover, Hector Cantu, who had followed the SUV along the 
highway for several miles, saw the Explorer's two tires up in the air4/ immediately before 
it left the pavement and rolled over in the median. (R. 11529, R.T. 1/29/07, p. 10 
[Addendum 4].) The eyewitness was not interviewed by Trooper Ross Pace, who wrote an 
accident report of the rollover. (R. 11479 R.T. 1/30/07 [Pace] p. 20 [Addendum 6].) 
Appellants' engineering expert, David Ingebretsen, PhD, testified the Explorer's 
right front steering tie rod broke before the rollover which was the cause of Tony's 
inability to control the SUV. (R. 11461, R.T. 1/17/07, pp. 191, 192, 202 [Addendum 3].) 
4
 Two wheels up in the air means the rollover has begun. (R. 11476, R.T. 1/23/07, 
p. 156 [Addendum 5].) 
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The Explorer first left the road on the left side for 116 feet, tracking the road's edge in 
gravel with its left side two wheels. The right two wheels remained on the roadway. Tony 
managed to steer the vehicle back on the road, with the one front wheel which was still 
connected. The SUV then spun around, reversing itself with the rear end passing the front 
end on the right before leaving the pavement for the last time. The Explorer rolled four 
full revolutions (16 quarter turns) across the highway median, coming to rest on the other 
side of the roadway in the west bound lanes. (R. 11461, R.T. 1/17/07, pp. 25-41; 
[Addendum 3].) 
The right steering tie rod was first noticed broken after it was purchased at a Copart 
Auction by Jack Bingham, an auto dealer. Bingham welded the right tie rod back together 
and then tested the Explorer at his yard by driving over a small hill, where the driver's side 
tie rod also broke. (R.l 1528, 1/29/07 [Bingham] pp. 7, 8, 10, 16, 17 [Addendum 7].) 
While investigating the cause of the rollover, Ingebretsen inspected the SUV and 
discovered it had a missing sway bar link and forensic evidence it had been missing for 
some time before the crash. (R. 11461, R.T. 1/17/07, p. 192 [Addendum 3]; R. 11527, 
R.T. 1/18/07, pp. 41-46, 48 [Addendum 8]; R. 11463, R.T. 1/19/07, p. 10 [Addendum 9].) 
Mr. Ingebretsen testified that a sway bar (the anti-sway device) makes the Explorer 
more resistant to rollover. The Explorer's stability is measured by its static stability factor. 
According to Ingebretsen, the Explorer's center of gravity changes depending on its tire 
size. (R. 11461, R.T. 1/17/07, pp. 181-182, 186, 187 [Addendum 3].) The 1995-1997 UN 
105 Explorer was signed off by Ford as resistant to rollover using computer simulations 
called ADAMS. (Admitted Trial Exhibit 71A [Addendum 29].) Regarding the Explorer's 
7 
stability, Ingebretsen testified a twenty pound change in the computer modeling makes a 
difference whether the Explorer passes or fails Ford's safety stability test. (R. 11476, R.T. 
1/23/07, p. 159 [Addendum 5].) 
Tony's father, Fred Clayton, testified it was his son's custom and habit to wear his 
seat belt. There was evidence that Tony was safety conscientious about the SUV's 
seatbelts. He took the Explorer into the dealership and complained that one of the rear 
seat belts did not operate. A quarter was found stuck inside of the buckle. (R. 11459, R.T. 
[Clayton] p. 22, 35, 79 [Addendum 10].) 
Mr. Ingebretsen, who is also a biomechanical engineer, testified the first impact 
caused the driver's door to unlatch. Upon inspection, Mr. Ingebretsen observed a very 
light witness mark on Tony's seat belt. Ingebretsen testified that the witness mark was not 
strong because in a rollover, the harness moves sideways instead of in a forward motion, 
and there is very little if any restraint capability. Seatbelts are "designed for frontal 
collisions." (R. 11461,R.T. 1/17/07, pp. 147-148 [Addendum 3].) Ingebretsen offered 
logical explanations for the seat belt to unlatch. Something could have been caught in 
between the latch plate and the buckle. It was possible the belt inertially unlatched. There 
could have been an object caught between the console which caused it to open as Tony's 
hip was moving to the right and forward during the rollover. (R. 11477, R.T. 1/24/07 a.m., 
pp. 19-20 [Addendum 11].) 
Based on the witness mark, and the physics and Tony's injury pattern, Ingebretsen 
concluded Tony's seat belt opened between the first and third quarter rolls. Ingebretsen 
testified that Tony was probably against the driver's door during the third quarter turn 
8 
while the door was against the ground. Between the first and second complete roll, the 
door flew open causing Tony's ejection. (R. 11461, R.T. 1/17/07, pp. 30, 31, 33, 146-147 
[Addendum 3].) 
Mr. Andrew Gilberg, a former Ford safety engineer, testified regarding the 
Explorer's door latch design. He found the driver's door subjected to longitudinal 
crushing, a design defect which caused the actuating rod to move during the crash and 
release the inside door latch. (R. 11474, R.T. 1/11/07, pp. 4, 40 [Addendum 70].) 
The jury was shown Exhibit 389, a 1994 cables verses rods study which established 
that Ford knew that the door foreshortened during crashes. [See Addendum 78.] Mr. 
Ingebretsen also testified the roof/door supporting A and B Pillars, are part of the total 
door system, and this weakness contributed to the door rod foreshortening. (R. 11463, R.T. 
1/19/07, p. 89 [Addendum 9]; R. 11476, R.T. 1/23/07 pp. 209, 210 [Addendum 5].) 
Although Kellie was belted, her blood was found on the Explorer's interior roof 
from contact and from blood splatter. (R. 11461, R.T. 1/17/07, pp. 59, 60 [Addendum 3].) 
She suffered a sheer frontal lobe brain injury and facial lacerations. Kellie's teeth were 
knocked out and her eyes were knocked out of line, requiring prisms to correct her vision 
for life. (R. 11461, R.T. 1/17/07 p. 129 [Addendum 3].) She suffered traumatic amnesia 
and does not recall the events of the rollover. 
Ford argued Tony was inattentive or fell asleep; the rollover was due to driver 
error; Tony caused his own death because he was unbelted. However, during trial, it was 
demonstrated how easily the seat belt could unlatch when force is concentrated on the 
buckle. Ford's expert called appellants' demonstration a "parlor trick." (R. 11483 R.T. 
9 
2/9/07, p.m., p. 5-6, 81, 52 [Addendum 12].) Ford took the contradictory position that 
Tony's hip could load the door latch to a breaking point, but could not cause the seat belt 
buckle latch to release. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I. A new trial should be granted because an irregularity in the 
proceedings occurred when Ford presented and asked the jury to rely upon the physically 
altered door latch. The trial court further erred by denying appellants' new trial motion 
without considering the affidavit of appellants' engineer, Andrew Gilberg. 
POINT II. The trial court erred in excluding relevant impeachment evidence that 
Ford's previous door latch engineer expert photographed the driver's door latch bolts 
(jaws) in an open position, and offered an expert opinion upon inspecting the Clayton 
Explorer's door which was consistent with appellants' expert's theory. 
POINT III. Appellants' proposed special verdict form should have been given 
because it would have focused the jury's deliberation on the contested design defect 
issues. Ford's special verdict form misled the jury because it invited the jury to deliberate 
on only one theory and removed other defect theories from the jury's deliberation. 
POINT IV. The trial court erred as a matter of law by instructing the jury with 
Jury Instruction Nos. 27, 30, and 31. 
POINT V. The trial court erred as a matter of law by granting Ford's bifurcation 
motion. Evidence of the severity of the occupants' injuries was relevant to Jury 
Instruction No. 23. 
POINT VI. The trial court erred by excluding several of Ford's internal 
10 
engineering documents and memoranda since they were evidence of Ford's knowledge the 
Explorer was unstable and prone to rollover with P-235 size tires BEFORE the Clayton 
Explorer was sold, and demonstrated a safer, alternative design. 
POINT VII. The trial court erred in directing a verdict in Ford's favor on the 
marketing/fraud issue because there were questions of fact warranting the jury's 
deliberation and resolution. 
POINT VIII. The trial court's remarks and actions taken as a whole coerced the 
jury into a hasty and unreasoned verdict. 
POINT IX. It was plain error for the trial court to leave Juror No. 3 seated on the 
jury after the juror made statements to other jurors indicating his inability to remain 
impartial. 
POINT X. The trial court committed prejudicial error because Ford was allowed 
to present statistical evidence of other dissimilar rollover accidents. 
POINT XI, The trial court erred by allowing Trooper Pace to testify as an expert 
about his theories of causation. 
POINT XII. The judgment should be reversed due to cumulative error. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
FORD PERPETRATED A FRAUD ON THE JURY BY PRESENTING 
ALTERED EVIDENCE DURING TRIAL WHICH PREVENTED 
APPELLANTS FROM HAVING A FAIR TRIAL 
Introduction. The driver's door opened during the rollover, causing Tony Clayton 
to be ejected to his death. Appellants' expert opined the door opened because of a design 
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defect that allows the latch to unintentionally open due to crash impact. Ford's expert 
opined that Tony Clayton was 250 pounds, and that his weight, together with the force of 
the rolling Explorer, broke the latch open, and that this is not a defect. Ford's expert, Ed 
Caulfield, used a mock test (the "transverse load" test) to demonstrate his theory. 
The latch bolts grasp a latch pin in the door frame to keep the door closed. A latch 
that breaks from a transverse load, does so before the latch bolts are fully open. If the 
latch bolts were fully open, the latch conformed to appellants' design defect theory. 
The Record. Shortly before trial, and a full year after expert discovery cut-off, 
Ford's attorneys moved the court for an order to remove the driver's side door latch. Ford 
claimed it was necessary to observe crucial undisputable evidence of the door's occupant 
loading. (R. 6560-6637 [Addendum 48].) 
Mr. Caulfield, CEO of Packer Engineering, signed an affidavit and submitted a 
photograph with a circle around a particular opening in the latch housing, promising he 
would be able to view crucial and irrefutable material evidence of physical damage from 
the door overloading if the latch was removed. (R. 6753-6756, 6748 [Addendum 48].) 
Mr. Caulfield's stated removal of the latch would reveal a landing and a detent which 
could be viewed through the particular opening built into the latch. The photograph 
submitted with Caulfield's affidavit states: "This is the factory window we are able to 
view internal damage through." (R. 6748 [Addendum 49].) 
Over appellants' objection (R. 6657-6741), the court allowed Ford to remove the 
door latch. (R. 6811.) It was sent to Packer Engineering to be "inspected" and 
"photographed." Ford thereafter did not advise appellants that Mr. Caulfield had found 
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what he was looking for. Indeed, no supplemental report was provided. Only days before 
trial, the latch was sent to appellants' engineering expert, Mr. Gilberg, whose office is in 
Georgia. He delivered the latch to the trial court in the same box with out inspection. 
Two weeks after Mr. Gilberg testified, Ford called Ed Caulfield and began 
examining him with enlarged photographic exhibits of the door latch which depicted the 
condition of the latch after its removal. It was only during Mr. Caulfield's direct 
examination, and only after being shown the enlarged photograph exhibits, that appellants 
discovered the latch fork bolts, which had always been in an open position, and had always 
been photographed "open" during every other vehicle inspection, and had formerly been 
partially movable, could no longer be moved.5/ The jaws were forced and jammed into a 
partially closed position. 
This new "evidence" supported Mr. Caulfield's theory of occupant loading. 
Because the alteration was subtle, neither appellants, nor Mr. Gilberg noticed it until after 
appellants' counsel saw the enlarged photographs at trial during Ford's presentation of its 
defense. 
Appellants moved for a new trial based on the altered door latch, and inaccurate 
photographic exhibits depicting the altered door latch which was shown to the jury. (R. 
10949-10951, 10953-10959;R. 11226-11241.) During oral argument discussing the door 
latch, Ford's counsel misled the court and misrepresented Mr. Gilberg's actions during a 
May 2005 vehicle inspection as follows: 
5
 The terms "jaws," "pawls," and "latch bolts" refer to the same part on the latch. 
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(Mr. Larsen) ,..[A]t Mr. Gilbert's (sic) inspection, he likewise took photographs of 
the latch and it's interesting to me, because I was there and I was present and I 
recall and these photographs also show exactly what happened, and Mr. Emblem 
was - was there as well, [^ f] The first photograph...is the latch showing the two bolts 
or screws that Mr. Emblem's pointed out, with the tang that's nearest to those, 
sticking out slightly beyond the edge of the fish mouth... With their next photograph 
taken by Mr. Gilbert (sic) and what he's done is, he's taken metal pliers or a device 
and he moved the fork bolts, he's got to get them as close as he could to try and get 
them in what they call the secondary position..." (R.T. 5/7/07, pp. 21-22, emphasis 
added [Addendum 52].) 
Within days, appellants submitted Mr. Gilberg's affidavit to factually rebut the false 
representations made about Gilberg's vehicle inspection and the use of pliers to 
manipulate the fork bolts during the inspection. (R. 11363-11365.) Gilberg's affidavit 
states that Ford's counsel's statement was "a blatant falsehood." [Addendum 53, emphasis 
added.] 
Mr. Gilberg further states that during his inspection, he found the latch to be fully 
open as did Ford's previously designated door latch engineer, Tom Tiede, who reported 
the latch "open" in his report. Gilberg's affidavit states that movement of the fork bolts 
using tools would violate the forensic engineer's ethical standards not to manipulate 
evidence. He further states that none of the other photographs taken by Ford's other 
engineers during their vehicle inspections show the fork bolts had ever been moved from 
the same condition they were found following the subject accident. [Addendum 53] 
The trial court rejected Gilberg's affidavit, ruling it would not be considered 
because Ford had no opportunity to refute it. (R. 11370 [Addendum 54].) Thereafter, the 
trial court denied appellants' motion for new trial. (R. 11373-11375 [Addendum 17].) 
Argument. The grounds in Utah R.Civ. P. Rule 59 do not specifically identify 
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fraud as a basis to set aside a jury's verdict and granting a new trial. Nonetheless, under 
Utah Civ. P. Rule 59 (a)(1), a new trial should be granted if there is an irregularity in the 
proceedings which prevents a party from receiving a fair trial. Although there is limited 
case law in Utah on what constitutes an "irregularity" sufficient to warrant a new trial, 
fraud should logically be held to constitute an irregularity at trial. This Court should follow 
the Ohio Court of Appeal's reasoning in Meyer v. Srivastava 141 Ohio App. 3d 662, 666-
667 [752 N.E.2d 1011] (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) which examined Ohio Civ. P. Rule 59 
(a)(1).6/ 
Where the jury's verdict is based on fraud, the judgment should be voidable. 
Equitable relief against fraudulent evidence is not a statutory creation. It is a judicially 
devised remedy fashioned to relieve hardships which, from time to time, arise 
from a hard and fast adherence to a court-made rule. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. 
Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 248 [64 S. Ct. 997, 88 L. Ed. 1250] (U.S. 1944).7/ 
How the Door Latch Fraud Occurred. There is a very distinct difference 
between zealous advocacy and fraud by manufactured evidence. Packer Engineering 
inspected the driver's door latch two times - in July 2005 and again in October 2007. The 
photographic evidence, including many photographs taken by Ford's other experts during 
6
 Ohio Civ. P. Rule 59 (a)(1) provides: "Irregularity in the proceedings of the 
court, jury, magistrate, or prevailing party, or any order of the court or magistrate, or 
abuse of discretion, by which an aggrieved party was prevented from having a fair trial." 
7
 A jury's verdict can be set aside when the ends of justice require it. An appellate 
court can also set aside the jury's verdict. Kilpack v. Wignall, 604 P.2d 462, 466 (Utah 
1979), citing Weeks v. Latter-day Saints Hospital 418 F.2d 1035 (10th Cir. 1969). 
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earlier vehicle inspections, show that during eveiy vehicle inspection, the fork bolts were 
in an open position. 
It was only after Packer Engineering replaced Ford's door latch expert, that the 
fraud occurred. The evidence of Ford's fraud on the jury/court is considerable. 
Trial Exhibit, P-109A, a photograph taken by Ford's engineering expert who also 
testified at trial, Robert Pascarella, on February 3, 2003, shows the fork bolts 
aligned (in an open position). R. 10984 [Addendum 55].) 
Trial Exhibits, P-302 AA, 302 BB, photographs taken by Ford's engineering expert, 
Larry Ragan on the same day, February 3, 2003, shows the latch open. (R.10986-
10987 [Addendum 56.) 
Trial Exhibits, P-304 F, 304 G, photographs by Ford's engineering expert, 
Catherine Corrigan on November 7, 2002, shows that during her inspection, the 
latch was open and the fork bolts were in plane. (R.10989-10990 [Addendum 57].) 
Trial Exhibit, P-490, a photograph taken by Ford's engineering expert, Geoffrey 
Germane, on June 11, 2002, depicts the latch open. (R.10992 [Addendum 58].) 
Trial Exhibit P-541, a photograph taken by Ford's engineering expert, Michael 
James, a month before Mr. Pascarella and Mr. Ragan's photographs, on January 3, 
2003, also shows the latch open. (R.10994 [Addendum 59].) 
When Mr. Caulfield's employee, Kevin Vosburgh, first inspected the Clayton 
Explorer on July 21, 2005, he also photographed the door latch as found, in an 
"open" position. (R.10996-11000 [Addendum 60 - Trial Exhibits P-320-D, P-320-
K, P- 467-47, P-467-52, P-467-125].) 
As emphasized, all of the Ford engineering photographs show the latch in an open 
position before Packer Engineering inspected the Clayton Explorer. Tom Tiede, Ford's 
door latch engineer, reported the door latch was in a fully open position. (R.11013-11015 
[Addendum 61].) During Packer Engineering's July 2005 inspection, Kevin Vosburgh 
gradually moved the latch while taking photographs, from an open position to other 
positions, depicting the jaws partially closed to coincide with the transverse load theory. 
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Photo exhibit (P-3201) shows the fork bolts adjusted by Vosburgh to fit Ford's 
newly retained expert's theory with a steel ruler held in place for an official 
"evidence" look. (R. 11002 [Addendum 62].) 
On October 27, 2006, just weeks before trial, Vosburgh took the latch back to 
Packer Engineering in Chicago for "inspection." (R. 11480,R.T. 1/31/07, p. 113 
[Addendum 63].) At trial, neither Ford nor Ed Caulfield presented any evidence about the 
factory window or any internal damage inside the window of the latch. The irrefutable 
evidence promised, never existed; it was a guise to remove the latch so it could be subtly 
altered into a forced fixed position before trial. 
The fraud was well choreographed. After removal, the fork bolts were jammed into 
a permanently partially closed position; the bolts were fixed out of plane. Packer 
Engineering then photographed the latch for its enlarged photographs to "compare" the 
latch with Caulfield's mock, latch breaking, transverse load test.8/ (R.11004-11005 
[Addendum 64].) The fork latch bolt was NO longer movable. 
Caulfield then testified at trial "this [the fixed door latch] is probably pretty close to 
the position it released in." (R. 11480, R.T. 1/31/07, p. 53 [Addendum 63].) The fact the 
fork bolts were now out of plane, misaligned, and no longer parallel (i.e., in an open 
position as photographed at every other previous vehicle inspection) was used to 
corroborate Mr. Caulfield's opinion the door did not open with rod operation. (R. 11481, 
R.T. 2/1/07, a.m. pp. 78, 118 [Addendum 65].) Plainly stated, Ford's agents manufactured 
evidence needed to support the new theory. 
8
 Caulfield's transverse load test pulled a Ford door latch until it broke using 
hydraulics. 
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The door latch was key evidence. In explaining his theory of why the inside rod had 
not compressed, Caulfield told the jury when the door was overloaded, there would be 
telltale signs present in (P-334), the Clayton latch. He described the two fork bolts 
tremendously out of plane. (R. 11480, R.T. 1/31/07, pp. 50, 51-52 [Addendum 63].) He 
testified if the latch had opened by inside activation compression, it would not look like 
the manipulated Clayton latch (P-334), but would be "fully open," and its fork bolts would 
look like the exemplar latch. (R. 11480, R.T. 1/31/07, p. 53 [Addendum 63].)9/ Mr. 
Caulfield admitted if the door latch was open then it was caused as appellants' door latch 
expert said - - due to the rod actuation from the door foreshortening.10/ All of the 
photographs clearly depict the latch fully open like the exemplar latch. 
Ford's counsel must have known there was NO internal damage discovered by 
Caulfield through the factory window and the attorneys had to have questioned him about 
9
 On cross-examination, Mr. Caulfield acknowledged again that if the Clayton 
latch was folly open, it was evidence of rod operation actuation, which was how 
appellants' expert Mr. Gilberg claimed the door opened and was a design defect. (R. 
11481, R.T. 2/1/07, a.m., p. 66 [Addendum 65].) He admitted: "If it were inside handle 
activation it would have unlocked it, the door latch would have been open," (R. 11480, 
R.T. 1/31/07, p. 117 [Addendum 63]) but by then because the door latch fork bolts had 
been tampered with, it looked like Caulfield's transverse load test. 
10
 This is a design defect. Caulfield demonstrated the exemplar latch (Exhibit 
464-A-l) and what it looked like in the "open" position as follows: 
When they're both released as if it were a mechanism activation, meaning handle 
or foreshortening, they will release to a position like this. All the front tails are 
completely hidden. (R. 11480, R.T. 1/31/07, p. 51 [Addendum 63].) 
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it beforehand.11/ Significantly, for the first time any photographs show the fork bolts pried 
out of plane is in the series of photographs taken by Vosburgh, before the latch was 
removed. (R. 11007 [Addendum 66].) The fraud perpetrated on the jury deprived 
appellants of a fair trial. Mr. Caulfielcl used the altered evidence to say "the forks are 
misaligned...these forks should be running parallel... just like...scissors...They're no 
longer on parallel paths...there's no longer alignment between the upper and the lower 
fork. (R. 11480, R.T. 1/31/07, pp. 117-118 [Addendum 63].) 
In appellants' case, the fraud occurred because counsel, in collaboration with 
Ford's newly retained door latch expert, convinced the court to remove the door latch after 
all expert discovery and depositions were completed, shortly before trial. 
This is not the first time a party has alleged Ford perpetrated fraudulent testimony. 
In Chewning v. Ford Motor Co., 354 S.C. 72, 78 [579 S.E.2d 605] (S.C. 2003), the 
Supreme Court of South Carolina defined extrinsic fraud: 
[A]s that species of fraud which does, or attempts to, subvert the integrity of the 
Court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial 
machinery cannot perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases 
that are presented for adjudication. 
In Chewning v. Ford Motor Co., 354 S.C. 72, supra, the consumer was injured in a 
rollover accident involving a Bronco II. Chewning alleged that Ford hired an expert to 
11
 Packer Engineering certainly moved the fork bolts to demonstrate the latch was 
loaded. It became "jammed," and was out of plane and partially closed. (R.T. 2/1/07, 
a.m., pp. 78, 110 [Addendum 65].) In Exhibit 302 BB, the close-up of the door latch, the 
photograph shows that the fork bolts are in plane, both tongs are behind the fish mouth 
indicating the door latch is wide open; there is NO gap between the two fork bolts which 
occurred after the latch was altered. (R. 10984 [Addendum 55].) 
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testify falsely during numerous trials, including his, involving the same vehicle model. 
The South Carolina Supreme Court held that the manufacturer's subornation of perjury, if 
proven by clear and convincing evidence, constituted extrinsic fraud. (Id. at pp. 82-83.) 
The South Carolina Supreme Court also found that because fraud upon the court is an 
affront to the administration of justice, a litigant who has been defrauded need not 
establish prejudice. 
The fraud that occurred in appellants' case is similar to the fraudulent photographs 
shown to the jury in Meyer v. Srivastava, supra, 141 Ohio App. 3d 662. In that case, the 
appellants moved for a new trial pursuant to Ohio Civ.R. 59(A)(1), claiming the particular 
water heater photographs shown to the jury at trial were not photographs of the water 
heater that was in the apartment where the explosion occurred; the photographs were from 
an adjoining apartment. (Id. at p. 666.) The Meyer court reasoned: 
The lower court's decision overruling plaintiffs' motion, filed pursuant to Ohio R. 
Civ. P. 59, requesting a new trial constitutes an abuse of discretion because the 
lower court, in an unreasonable, arbitrary fashion, concluded that the surprise, 
dramatic introduction of false evidence on a central trial issue did not deprive 
plaintiffs of a substantial - and therefore a fair trial - because the jury could have 
found the defendant was not negligent even if the false testimony had not been 
introduced. (Emphasis added; Id. at pp. 666-667.) 
In appellants' case, not only were the photographs irregular since they depicted the 
altered latch, the jury was shown and asked to consider the altered physical latch. 
However, the trial court here used the same incorrect reasoning to deny appellant's motion 
for new trial. The lower court stated: "...after reviewing the record, the Court is of the 
opinion there is ample evidence to support the jury's finding regarding the door latch." (R. 
11375 [Addendum 17.) This is not the correct standard. The lower court should have 
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considered Ford's pretextual removal of the door latch, the surprise timing of the 
manipulated evidence through the door latch photographs and testimony, and Ford's 
argument to the jury which was prejudicial as follows: 
He [Mr. Caulfield] explained about the striker. Should be pointing directly toward 
the front of the vehicle. Its rotated out at 25 degrees. Okay? In the foreshortening 
theory it opens the latch. There's nothing left hanging onto the striker. The force 
was so g,reat that it rotated it away from the vehicle to that 25-degree angle. In the 
in the rod foreshortening theory, that Exhibit 478-138. In the rod foreshortening 
theory, bing, the latch is open. It's not holding on to anything. Not this latch. Not 
the Clayton latch. The [fork] pawls were bent partially open, and the, and the entire 
latch mechanism was bent. Here it is again. And here's 956-B. These are in 
evidence. The latch itself is in evidence. Look at the bowing there. Very much 
like the transverse test that Dr. Caulfield did...You don't get that, folks, from this 
latch theory. The physical evidence shows it didn't happen that way." (Emphasis 
added; R. 11483, R.T. 2/9/07, p.m., pp. 63-64 [Addendum 12].) 
The trial court also erred by refusing to consider Mr. Gilberg's affidavit as rebuttal 
evidence. Ford's counsel misrepresented Gilberg's actions at the May 2005 vehicle 
inspection. Gilberg's affidavit was under penalty of perjury. Mr. Larsen's representations 
were not under oath. Rebuttal evidence is evidence tending to refute, modify, explain, or 
otherwise minimize or nullify the effect of the opponent's evidence. Board of Education 
v. Barton, 617 P.2d 347, 349 (Utah 1980). Moreover, a court may open the judgment if 
one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of 
law. Utah R. Civ. P. 59. 
In this case, when appellants' new trial motion was made, Mr. Gilberg had already 
returned to Georgia. Gilberg's affidavit states the latch bolts were not moved with pliers 
during his inspection as Ford's attorney alleged, and as proof, all of the other expert 
inspection photographs show that latch bolts were not out of plane. This was not merely a 
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difference of opinion. It was a factual misrepresentation at the new trial hearing. There 
was substantial evidence presented that the door latch had been tampered with after court-
ordered removal. The importance of the defective latch was life or death for Tony 
Clayton. At a minimum, the trial court should have ordered an evidentiary hearing. A 
new trial is warranted. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING RELEVANT IMPEACHMENT 
EVIDENCE EXCHANGED PURSUANT TO UTAH RULE OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE RULE 26 (a)(3)(A) 
The Record. Appellants sought to introduce the expert opinion and findings of 
Mr. Thomas Tiede. Tiede was Ford's designated door latch expert and his report and 
photographs from his 2002 vehicle inspection were exchanged before trial pursuant to R. 
Civ. P. 26 (a)(3)(A). Tiede inspected and photographed the Clayton Explorer door latch 
on July 15, 2002. He documented that he found the latch bolts in a "folly open position." 
(R.11013-11015 [Addendum 61].) 
In July 2005, Ford hired Ed Caulfield who offered a different opinion and disagreed 
with Mr. Tiede's findings and conclusions. (R.11274-11275 [Addendum 67].) Prior to 
trial, Ford moved to exclude Mr. Tiede's opinions and findings. (R. 6837-6996.) The trial 
court, over appellants' objections, granted Ford's motion. (R. 8501-8510 [Addendum 68]; 
R. 9582-9595 [Addendum 21].) During trial, appellants moved the court to reconsider its 
ruling. (R.10232-10240 [Addendum 69].) Ed Caulfield was questioned outside the 
presence of the jury as follows: 
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Q. Did you consider his (Tiede's) opinion that the interior door handle rod 
could have actuated this latch causing the door to open? 
A. I read that in his report, if that what you mean by "consider it." And I 
eliminated it from the possibilities. 
Q. Mr. Tiede was a Ford engineer; isn't that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And he worked in the very department where those door latches were 
developed; isn't that correct? 
A. I believe that's correct... 
Q. But nonetheless you have a different opinion concerning that? 
A. Concerning how the door opened? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Well, unequivocally, yes, I do have a different opinion. 
(Emphasis added; R. 11481, R.T. 2/1/07, a.m. pp. 31-32 [Addendum 65].) 
After this colloquy, the trial court still refused to allow appellants to use Tiede's 
door latch findings and photographs that the latch was in a fully open position to impeach 
Mr. Caulfield. Appellants thereafter moved for a new trial on the basis of the excluded 
evidence (R. 10950, 10959-10961 [Addendum 50]), which the trial court denied. (R. 
11373, 11375 [Addendum 17].) 
Argument. Bias, prejudice or any motive to misrepresent may be shown by 
examination of the witness or by evidence otherwise adduced. Utah R. Evid. 608(c); Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-24-1. Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of 
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any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence. 
Utah R. Evid. 401. Tiede's report and photographs were exchanged pursuant to R. 
Civ. P. 26, and were therefore proper impeachment evidence. The advisory committee 
note for Rule 26 (a)(3) discussing "expert reports" provides: "[i]n effect, the report will 
serve in lieu of responses to standard interrogatories." Emphasis added. Thus, the 
evidence was produced as discovery and should have been available to impeach Mr. 
Caulfield at trial. 
Appellants were prejudiced. As emphasized, Ford argued to the jury: 
In the rod foreshortening theory, bing, the latch is open. If snot holding on to 
anything. Not this latch. Not the Clayton latch. The [fork] pawls were bent partially 
open, and the, and the entire latch mechanism was bent. Here it is again. And here's 956-
B. These are in evidence. The latch itself is in evidence. Look at the bowing there. Very 
much like the transverse test that Dr. Caulfield did...You don't get that, folks, from this 
latch theory. The physical evidence shows it didn't happen that way." (Emphasis added; 
R. 11483, R.T. 2/9/07, p.m., pp. 63-64 [Addendum 12].) 
The Tiede impeachment evidence was not cumulative of Ford engineer 
photographic evidence. (See R. 11257-11264.) Tiede worked for Ford for over thirty 
years and designed some of Ford's door latches. (R. 11013.) 
Consistent with his report, Tiede's photos unequivocally show the door latch in an 
open position during his inspection and the fork bolts are in plane. (R. 11257-11264.) 
After Packer Engineering got its hands on the latch, the fork bolts were misaligned, out of 
plane and partially closed.12/ The excluded evidence was probative because Tiede was 
12
 (See, R. 11480, R.T. 1/31/07, pp. 117-118 [Addendum 63]; R. 11481, R.T. 
2/1/07, a.m., pp. 78, 110 [Addendum 65].) 
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hired to specifically investigate the Clayton door latch and the cause of the door opening. 
Mr. Tiede found both bolts were fully opened and noted the lack of fork bolt deformation, 
opining as did Mr. Gilberg, that "[t]he inside driver door linkage was most probably 
actuated during the rollover. (R. 11014, 11015 [Addendum 61].) The Explorer rolled over 
the opened door, slamming it against the ground. (R. 11474, R.T. 1/11/07, pp. 75, 86.) 
Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it has a tendency to influence the outcome of the 
trial by improper means. Terry v. Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314, 323 n.31 
(Utah 1979). The Tiede impeachment evidence was extremely probative. A new trial 
should be granted because the report was a party admission under Rule 26(a)(3) when it 
was exchanged. Exclusion of relevant probative evidence constitutes and error of law, 
Utah R. Civ. P. 59 (a)(7), which requires reversal. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY INSTRUCTING THE JURY WITH 
FORD'S SPECIAL VERDICT FORM BECAUSE IT MISLED THE JURY 
The Record. Appellants' amended complaint alleges strict liability, negligence and 
failure to warn. (R. 717-745 [Addendum 1].) 
Appellants presented expert engineering testimony and evidence that the space 
within which the steering and suspension must operate the 1997 Explorer is insufficient 
(R. 11463, R.T. 1/19/07, pp. 88, 89 [Addendum 9]); that the Explorer's sway bar link is 
defective because it breaks too easily (R. 11463, R.T. 1/19/07, p. 11, 12, 18, 19, 89 
[Addendum 9]); that the Explorer's design limits of travel is defective because it allows 
reverse bending of the steering tie rod, leading to breakage (R. 11463, R.T. 1/19/07, p. 19 
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[Addendum 9]); that the Explorer's P-235 tires raised the center of gravity (R. 11463, R.T. 
1/19/07, p. 89 [Addendum 9]); and that the Explorer was unstable and did not pass the J-
turn test until the computer model was tweaked 20 pounds. (R. 11476, R.T. 1/23/07, p. 159 
[Addendum 5].) 
Appellants also presented evidence that the door latch design was defective because 
it permitted unintended opening during a foreseeable rollover (R. 11474, R.T. 1/11/07, pp. 
35, 40, 100 [Addendum 70]), and the passenger compartment failed to protect the 
occupants from injury during a foreseeable event. (R. 11461, R.T. 1/17/07, p. 148 
[Addendum 3].) 
Each of these issues required the jury to make individual consideration of the 
evidence. 
On February 8, 2008, the day before closing arguments, appellants submitted their 
proposed special interrogatories at a jury instruction conference. (R.10395; R. 10377-
10383 [Addendum 71].) Ford also submitted its proposed special verdict form. (R. 
10510-10513 [Addendum 72].) The court rejected both of the proposed special verdict 
forms. On morning of February 9, 2008, in chambers and before closing argument, 
appellants submitted a revised special verdict form. [Addendum 73]13/ 
Appellants' revised special verdict form required the jury to consider alternative 
theories as follows: 
13
 Appellants have requested that the record be augmented to include the revised 
proposed Special Jury Verdict form. Ford has opposed appellant's motion. Even without 
addressing appellants' revised form, the Court can reach the legal issue on whether Ford's 
Special Jury Verdict form erroneously instructed the jury on the law. 
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3. Was Ford Motor Company negligent in the design of the 1997 Explorer? 
5. Did Ford Motor Company fail to warn the Plaintiffs of a defective condition 
in the 1997 Explorer? 
6. Did Ford Motor Company breach a warranty to the Plaintiffs that the 
Explorer was fit for its intended purposes? 
Appellants' special verdict forrn was rejected in favor of Ford's revised jury form 
submitted the morning of February 9, 2007 (R. 10608-10610 [Addendum 74]), over 
appellants' objections. (R. 11483, R.T. 2/9/07, p.m., pp. 116-117 [Addendum 12].) 
Argument. Special verdicts or interrogatories are appropriate when they assist the 
jury in sorting out difficult issues presented. Cambelt Int'l Corp, v. Dalton, supra, 745 
P.2d 1239, 1241. A party should be allowed to present its theories in a complex case in a 
clear and understandable way. See, Ames v. Maas, supra, 846 P.2d 468, 471. The purpose 
of special interrogatories is to test the correctness of the jury's general verdict by 
ascertaining facts upon which it is based. Each question can call for a direct answer in 
reference to a single, material, as well as ultimate fact. Berg v. Otis Elevator Co,, 64 Utah 
518, 530 [231 F. 83] (Utah 1924). 
Products liability always requires proof of a defective product, which can include 
"manufacturing flaws, design defects, and inadequate warnings regarding use." Grundberg 
v. Upjohn Co,, 813 P.2d 89, 92 (Utah 1991). Alternative theories are available to prove 
different categories of defective product. See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product 
Liability § 2 cmt. n(1997).14/ 
14
 Alternative theories entail different elements. See generally, 63 Am.Jur. 2d 
Products Liability § 8 (1996) ("[A] defect in a product may consist of a mistake in 
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Because there were several theories of defect, appellants' interrogatories were 
concise and based on specific theories. Appellants' form specifically required the jury to 
deliberate on the design defects under several theories and the inadequate warning on 
foreseeable use of the SUV with P-235 tires. Appellants' proposed special jury form 
should have been given since it would have focused the jury on each contested issue in this 
complex engineering trial. Instead the trial court gave Ford's special verdict form which 
was an erroneous statement of the law. 
Ford's special verdict form instructed the jury to answer only one question: 
"Was the subject 1997 Ford Explorer defective and unreasonably dangerous." 
Ford's unreasonably simplistic interrogatory was prejudicial. The jury was invited 
to abandon a rigorous review and application of the jury instructions and evidence. 
Appellants were prejudiced because Ford capitalized by urging the jury to deliberate on 
only one issue: 
...and you have a jury verdict form and there's one question that starts with: 'Do 
you find that there is a defect in this Ford Explorer? Yes of no?' And if you answer 
no, then your work is done. (R. 11483, R.T. 2/9/07, p.m., p. 83 [Addendum 12].) 
Ford's special jury verdict form was particularly egregious because it took some of 
the defect issues away from the jury without a summary judgment motion or directed 
verdict. The jury was required to deliberate on all theories. See, Vitale v. Belmont Springs, 
916 P.2d 359, 363 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). A special verdict form cannot mislead the jury to 
manufacturing, improper design, or the inadequacy or absence of warnings regarding the 
use of the product.") Bishop v. GenTec, Inc., 2002 UT 36, P25 [48 P.3d 218] (Utah 2002). 
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the prejudice of the complaining party or erroneously state the law. Cf., Summer ill v. 
Shipley, supra, 890 P.2d 1042, 1044. 
Ford's special verdict form misled the jury. The error was exacerbated when the 
trial court sequestered the jury late on Friday afternoon which forced the jury to rush 
through the evidence. Accordingly, the judgment should be reversed because the special 
verdict form misled the jury in the deliberation process. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GIVING JURY INSTRUCTION 
NOS. 27,, 30 AND 31 
The Record. Over appellants' objections, the trial court instructed the jury with 
Instruction No.s 27, 30, 31. (R. 10579, 10582, 10583 [Addendum 75]; see also, R. 11483, 
R.T. 2/9/07, p.m., p. 115 [Addendum 12]; R. 10286, 10296-10298 [Addendum 76].) 
Argument Jury instructions should clearly, concisely and accurately state the 
issues and law aipplicable to the case so the jury will understand its duties. See, Nielsen v. 
Pioneer Valley Hosp., 830 P.2d 270, 274-75 (Utah 1992) explaining the trial court's 
failure to clarify jury instructions resulted in confusing instructions may have prejudiced 
the case. 
Instruction No. 27. The jury was instructed with Ford's modified jury instruction as 
follows: 
The manufacturer has a duty to design and manufacture a product to eliminate any 
unreasonable risk of foreseeable injury, [^ f] However, there is no duty to make a 
safe product safer. A manufacturer has no duty to refrain from marketing a non-
defective product when a safer model is available, or to inform the consumer of the 
availability of the safer model. (Emphasis added. R. 10579 [Addendum 75].) 
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The emphasized above instruction is not based on any Utah model jury instruction. 
Ford relied upon dicta from Slisze v. Stanley-Bostitch, 1999 UT 20, P10 [979 P.2d 317] 
(Utah 1999). While absent a showing of duty, a plaintiff cannot recover, see, Jackson v. 
Mateus, 2003 UT 18, P7 [70 P.3d 7] (Utah 2003), the dicta had the potential of confusing 
the jury on the issue of "duty." The language also had the potential to confuse the jury on 
the issue of availability of a safer model as instructed in Jury Instruction No. 23.15/ 
The dicta in Jury Instruction No. 27 was argumentative. It insinuated that the trial 
court was suggesting the Explorer was safe. Such an instruction amounts to an improper 
superfluous judicial comment on the evidence and as such it was prejudicial. 
Instruction No. 30. Ford requested Jury Instruction No. 29 which instructed the 
jury to determine whether Tony was at fault and caused the rollover and the occupants' 
injuries. In addition to Instruction No. 29, the trial court gave Instruction No. 30, a "look 
out" instruction (patterned after MUJI 5.14) over appellants' objections. (R. 10286, 
10296-10298 [Addendum 76] P's Supp. Obj., p. 12; see also, R. 11483, R.T. 2/9/07, p.m., 
p. 115 [Addendum 12].) The instruction states: 
The law provides that any person in a motor vehicle on a public highway shall keep 
a proper lookout. A "proper lookout" means maintaining the lookout that an 
ordinarily careful person would use in light of all conditions existing at the time and 
those reasonable to be anticipated, [^ j] A "proper lookout" includes a duty to see 
objects and conditions in plain sight, to see that which is open and apparent and to 
realize obvious dangers. This duty does not merely require looking, but also 
15
 No. 23, states in part: "The availability of a substitute product that would serve 
the same function but would not be as dangerous, [^ f] The ease or difficulty with which 
the unsafe character of the product could be eliminated without impairing its usefulness 
or making it too expensive to maintain its utility." (R. 10575 [Addendum 75].) 
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requires observing and understanding other traffic and the general situation. (R. 
10582 [Addendum 75].) 
Jury Instruction No. 30 suggested to the jury that an improper type of analysis 
should be used to decide the case. It suggested that Tony failed in his duty to look out on 
the roadway where there was absolutely no evidence presented to support this instruction. 
See for example, Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329, 1336 (Utah 1993). The day of the 
rollover, the road conditions were clear and the pavement was dry. No one testified they 
saw Tony trying to avoid any hazards such as an oncoming car or a deer in the road. Also, 
there was no testimony that debris had been found on the pavement on the side of the road 
preceding the rollover. 
The standard of review for harmless error is whether the error is sufficiently 
inconsequential that there is no reasonable likelihood the error affected the outcome of the 
proceedings. Larsen v. Johnson, 958 P.2d 953, 958 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (citations 
omitted); see also Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 796 (Utah 1991). It was not 
harmless or inconsequential error to instruct the jury with this instruction because the jury 
may have relied on it to speculate that there was something in the road that caused Tony to 
swerve and go off the highway. Consequently, it too amounted to an inappropriate 
comment on the evidence. 
Instruction No. 31. The trial court also instructed the jury with Instruction No. 31, 
which is MUJI 5.1 which states: 
The driver of any vehicle has the duty to exercise reasonable care at all times to 
avoid placing others in danger. (R. 10583 [Addendum 75].) 
There was absolutely no evidence that Tony was driving over the speed limit or that 
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he otherwise failed to use reasonable care to avoid placing Kellie in danger. The sole 
eyewitness, Mr. Cantu, who followed the Explorer along the same route of the highway for 
several miles, never saw Tony do anything to place the passenger in danger. The error 
again was not harmless because Instructions No. 30 and 31 invited the jury to speculate as 
to what caused Tony to go off the road. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT CAUSED PREJUDICIAL ERROR WHEN IT 
BIFURCATED THE TRIAL 
The Record. Prior to trial, Ford filed a motion to bifurcate the "damages" portion 
of the case. Over appellants' objections (R. 8755-8774 [Addendum 77), the trial court 
granted Ford's motion. (R. 9582 [Addendum 21].) Appellants were thereafter precluded 
from presenting any substantial evidence of the occupants' injuries. 
Argument. Utah R. Civ. P. 42 is similar to the federal rule on bifurcation. A 
bifurcated trial is the exception, not the rule.16/ In appellant's case, bifurcation was 
improper because it prevented appellants from establishing a critical element of defect. 
"Injuries" are not synonymous with "damages." 
The excluded injury evidence would have established that Kellie suffered a sheer 
16
 Angelo v. Armstrong World Indus., 11 F.3d 957, 964 (10th Cir. 1993) 
[separation of issues is not to be routinely ordered].) The moving party (which was Ford) 
had the burden of establishing that separate trials were necessary. See, Buscemi v. 
Pepsico, Inc., 736 F. Supp. 1267, 1271 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). Regardless of efficiency and 
separability, bifurcation is an abuse of discretion if it prejudices a party. Angelo v. 
Armstrong World Indus., supra, 11 F.3d 957, 964; see also, Hines v. Joy Mfg. Co., 850 
F.2d 1146, 1152 (6th Cir. 1988); Martin v. Bell Helicopter Co., 85 F.R.D. 654, 658 (D. 
Colo. 1980). 
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frontal lobe brain injury, facial lacerations, her teeth were knocked out, and her eyes were 
knocked out of line, requiring prisms to correct her vision for her entire life. (R. 11461, 
R.T. 1/17/07 p. 129 [Addendum 3].) The evidence was relevant to Jury Instruction No. 23, 
and integral to the jury's consideration of the "[t]he gravity of danger posed by the design" 
and "the likelihood that such danger posed by the design would cause injury or damage. 
(R. 10575 [Addendum 75].) 
Appellants were prejudiced. The court gave Instruction No. 23, but without the 
integral injury evidence, the jury could not draw reasonable inferences or weigh the 
gravity of danger posed by the Explorer's design. The risk of the degree of potential 
injury goes directly to the quantity of care owed by the manufacturer. The greater the risk 
of grave injury or death is important to the jury's assessment of the degree of care 
incorporated in the design to protect the occupants in a foreseeable event. (R. 10953 
[Addendum 75].) 
Appellants have established the bifurcation deprived them of presenting relevant 
injury/design evidence. Kellie Montoya's injuries were a direct result of Ford's failure to 
protect the occupants in a foreseeable event. A new trial is warranted. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY EXCLUDING MANY OF FORD'S 
INTERNAL ENGINEERING DOCUMENTS AND MEMORANDA 
WHICH WERE RELEVANT TO ESTABLISH FORD'S KNOWLEDGE 
OF INSTABILITY AND DEFECTIVE DESIGN, AND SHOW THE 
FEASIBILITY OF A SAFER ALTERNATIVE DESIGN 
Introduction. The Bronco II (UN 46) model was renamed "Explorer" (UN 46) and 
sold as such from 1990 to 1994. The Explorer was redesigned with new front suspension 
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and sold as Explorer (UN 105) from 1995 to 1997, which includes the Clayton Explorer. 
The Record. Appellants' amended complaint alleges negligent design as follows: 
FORD engaged in inadequate stability and rollover crash worthiness testing of the 
Explorer and similar vehicles. (R. 727, Amended Complaint, f 31 a [Addendum 1].) 
Ford moved to exclude evidence of the Explorer's previous prototype designs, the 
previous Explorer testing and testing results. (R. 7036-7050.) Appellants objected. (See, R. 
8777-8842 [Addendum 25].) Appellants provided the court with an offer of proof that 
Ford initially intended the "Explorer (UN 46)," first sold as a model year 1990 vehicle, to 
be nothing more than a 4-door version, and a "freshening" of the 2-door Bronco II SUV 
model.17/ (R. 8785 [Addendum 25].) In the wake of negative Bronco II publicity relating 
to a federal investigation of the Bronco IPs rollover propensity, and a Consumer Report 
article which criticized rollover-related deaths and injuries related to the Bronco II, Ford 
renamed the UN46 - "the Explorer."18/ (R. 8790, 8792-8786, 8802-8813 [Addendum 
25].) 
At the time the UN46 (Bronco II/Explorer) was being designed, Ford engineer's 
proposed a safer, alternative design. Prior to manufacturing "the Explorer," on June 15, 
1989, Ford engineers suggested to management that the SUV should be built by widening 
17
 In 1991 Ford's document stated: "Note that the Bronco II has been removed 
from the Ranger column, and a new column entitled 'Explorer/Navajo' has been added. 
This reflects the replacement of the 1990 Bronco II by the newly named UN46 vehicles, 
Explorer and Navajo, beginning 1990 lA MY..." (R. 8835 [Addendum 25].) 
18
 The articles entitled How safe is the Bronco II? states: "The accident statistics -
whether you chose to give credence to the government's interpretation or Ford's - adds 
weight to our findings." (R. 8802, 8813 [Addendum 25].) 
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its track. (R. 8818 [Addendum 25].) Ford knew the 4-door Explorer model (UN 46) with 
P-235 tires was unstable. Ford's tests showed two-wheel lift; even with outriggers.19/ (R. 
8820, 8822 [Addendum 25].) 
However, Ford's management rejected the safety alternatives and built the 1995-
1997 Explorer with almost the same engine height, rather than lower the engine, which 
would have lowered the center of gravity. (R. 8826 [Addendum 25].) 
In rejecting the safety recommendations, Ford built the UN 105 - 1995-1997 
Explorer with almost the same exact track width and center of gravity height as the UN 46, 
Bronco II, renamed Explorer. (R. 8841-8842 [Addendum 25].) The track width to center 
of gravity ratio is important in evaluating the vehicle's resistance to rollover. 
Faced with the foregoing, the trial court initially denied Ford's pre-trial motion to 
exclude probative evidence of the Explorer's design and testing prior to the Clayton 
Explorer being manufactured. (R. 9588 [Addendum 21].) Appellants' engineering expert, 
Mr. Ingebretsen testified that Ford's engineer's reasoning stated in the documents was the 
type of information relied upon by experts in his field of expertise. (R. 11463, R.T. 
1/19/07, pp. 23-24 [Addendum 9].) However, during trial, the trial court to reconsider its 
pre-trial ruling and exclude Trial Exhibits 47, 49, 50A, 52, 53A, 58, 59A, 59D, 59E, 65, 
66, 69, 70, 75A and 75B (R.11530, R.T. 1/19/07, p.m. [Exhibit Hearing], pp. 8, 14-30 
19
 Ford also moved to exclude evidence of testing the Explorers tires, claiming the 
tire information was irrelevant. Appellants advised the court, that while this was not a 
"tire" case, as the documents demonstrate, Ford's stability testing on the Explorer and its 
prototypes, was tied to the size of tire (R. 11461, R.T. 1/17/07, p. 157, 161 [Addendum 
3]) and Ford knew the SUV was unstable with P-235 tires. 
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[Addendum 26]; R. 11476, R.T. 1/23/07, pp. 5, 10-18, 44, 53 [Addendum 5]). The court 
found that although the exhibits were party admissions, the evidence should otherwise be 
excluded. (11476, R.T. 1/23/07, pp. 54-56 [Addendums 5, 18].) 
Argument. Evidence of similar defects may be offered to show a defendant's 
notice of a particular defect, the magnitude of the defect or danger involved, and the 
defendant's ability to correct the known defect. Hessen v. Jaguar Cars, Inc., 915 F.2d 641, 
650 (11th Cir. 1990). Generally, where negligence is at issue, prior knowledge, 
complaints and opportunities to fix a problem regarding an allegedly hazardous condition 
are admitted as being probative of the defendant's knowledge. This knowledge, in turn, 
then operates as a standard against which reasonableness of the defendant's conduct with 
regard to the allegedly hazardous condition can be tested. Julander v. Ford Motor Co., 
488 F.2d 839, 846 (10th Cir. 1973); Koloda v. General Motors Parts Div., General Motors 
Corp., 716 F.2d 373, 376 (6th Cir. 1983). 
Appellants alleged the Explorer's margin of stability with P-235 tires made the 
Explorer defective and prone to rollover. Ford sold the Clayton Explorer with P-235 size 
tires.20/ (Trial Exhibit 5 [Addendum 27].) Appellants were precluded from presenting 
relevant material design evidence. Ford's expert, Donald Tandy, a Ford engineering 
expert (R. 10247-10248), previously testified in Buell-Wilson v. Ford that the engine 
height and track width of the UN 46 (the 1990 Explorer) and the UN 105 model (the 
Clayton Explorer) were very close. (R. 8841-8842 [Addendum 25].) Thus, the excluded 
20
 Ford's own 1997 brochure recommends only P-225 size tires on the XLT 
model. (Trial Exhibit 3 [Addendum 28].) 
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exhibits would have been probative and established what Ford knew about the Explorer's 
instability before the Clayton Explorer was manufactured and sold. Some documents 
would have established a safer alternative design. For example: 
Excluded Trial Exhibit 47 [Addendum 30] shows Ford's engineer's recommended 
in 1987 that resistance to rollover was a high engineering priority. (Id. at p. 2098) 
Ford knew from accident data that rollover accidents were more prevalent in light 
trucks than cars and that occupant ejections with rollovers were highest for utility 
vehicles and 4 x 4s up to twice the percentage of other light trucks and four times 
the percentage of cars. (Id. at p. 2099.) 
Excluded Trial Exhibit 50A [Addendum 31] shows Ford began using the J-Turn 
test for its "Corporate Safety Segment Design Guideline for Resistance to 
Rollover" with the Bronco II and knew the Explorer was also unstable. 
Excluded Trial Exhibit 52 [Addendum 32] is evidence that Ford's engineers 
proposed the Explorer's track be widened two inches (Id. at p. 1581) and shows the 
time necessary to implement this change. (Id. at p. 1582.) It also establishes that 
Ford's engineers concluded the speeds on the course for two wheel lift for the UN 
46 (90 Vi -94 Explorer) were essentially the same as Bronco II. 
Excluded Trial Exhibit 53 A [Addendum 33] shows the UN 46 prototype was 
failing Ford's J-turn tests even with outriggers on it which had significant effect on 
vehicle handling.21/(7d. at pp. 1276, 1277.) 
Excluded Trial Exhibit 58, [Addendum 34] a memorandum demonstrates Ford 
created "strawman" tests to get the Explorer to pass the rollover guidelines to 
market the SUV. The engineers stated: "[Release 4 Dr. only with base P225 AS 
Tires.]" 
Excluded Trial Exhibit 65 [Addendum 35] states: "I believe that management is 
aware of the potential risk w/F235 tires and has accepted the risk. (Emphasis 
added; Id. at p. 0619) The UN 46 Explorers were not passing the avoidance 
maneuver safety tests. According to one memorandum, on September 6, 1990, 
Ford's engineer, Don Tandy (who testified at trial) discussed a new modeling 
policy where ADAMS out put was only allowed to be discussed verbally with 
Ford's tire suppliers, rather than put any testing results in writing. (Id. at p. 15846) 
21
 In the ordinary world, no one drives on the highway with outriggers. Outriggers 
were needed while testing to help lower the center of gravity. 
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Excluded Trial Exhibit 49 [Addendum 36] consists of Ford's own video taped tests 
that visually demonstrate tip ups and two-wheel lifts while Ford was actually testing 
the UN 46 model. (Exhibit 49 demonstrates what the actual videos would show.) 
Excluded Trial Exhibit 59D [Addendum 37] a memorandum in April 1989 
demonstrates why the Bronco II was quickly renamed the "Explorer." (Id. at p. 
15248) 
Excluded Trial Exhibit 59 E [Addendum 38] shows the Bronco II was immediately 
dropped from Ford's sales lineup. 
Excluded Trial Exhibit 59A [Addendum 39] Ford's design meeting committee 
minutes from January 9, 1987, show the 1990 (UN 46) was the Bronco II, 2-door 
and 4-door models. (Id. at pp. 1526, 1527) The UN 105 (Clayton Explorer model) 
was initially going to be redesigned from the ground up as the "PN38." (Id. at p. 
1526) This excluded evidence is relevant to the feasibility of an alternative design. 
Excluded Trial Exhibit 69 [Addendum 40] shows in order to pass on-track tests 
Ford unreasonably loaded its SUVs to lower the center of gravity by putting lead 
shot on the seats. 
Excluded Trial Exhibit 70 [Addendum 41] discusses Ford's loading and when Ford 
places the load on the floor of the vehicle to test for stability it equates to a 1" 
Center of Gravity difference. Ford could have but was not using water dummies to 
simulate real-world conditions in its tests. 
Excluded Trial Exhibit 75A [Addendum 42] shows the proposed PN38 had a 63-65 
inch track width, a wider track than the UN 105 and UN 46 designs. The "PN38" 
design had a lower center of gravity. (Id. at p. 15681) 
Trial Exhibit 75 B [Addendum 43] shows the PN 38 was intended to replace the 
(Explorer) UN 46 line. (Id. at p. 1736F.) 
As argued in Point VII, infra, Ford continued to sell the (UN 46) Bronco II 4-door 
to the public, but changed its name and marketed the unstable SUV as the "Explorer," 
leading consumers, like Tony's father, to believe the newly released "Explorer" was 
"safe." 
The excluded exhibits were relevant to whether Ford knew of the dangerous design, 
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and had an opportunity to correct the defects. (See, Bado-Santana v. Ford Motor Co., 364 
F. Supp. 2d 79, 92-94 (D.PR. 2005) [in an Explorer rollover case, the court denied Ford's 
motion to exclude evidence of design and development history of the Bronco II, finding 
the evidence relevant to Ford's knowledge of and failure to correct stability design flaws].) 
Buell-Wilson v. Ford Motor Co., 141 Cal. App. 4th 525 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006)22/, 
involved a 1997 4-door Explorer with P-235 tires similar to the 4-door Explorer sold to the 
Clayton family. In Buell-Wilson, supra, Ford appealed from a jury verdict finding the 
1997 Explorer with P-235 tires defectively unstable. On appeal, Ford argued it was error 
to admit Bronco II/Explorer prototype design evidence. {Id. at p. 532, 541.) The court 
disagreed as follows: 
[Wjhere a plaintiff intends to adduce evidence of the functioning of related 
products to prove that the product in question was defective, identical conditions 
need not be present between the two systems. 
In that case, substantial similarity was sufficient because such evidence is relevant 
to "Ford's knowledge of and failure to correct stability design flaws." {Id. at pp. 542-543.) 
The Buell-Wilson court concluded: 
...[T]he evidence was relevant to prove that Ford knew it was designing and 
manufacturing a vehicle with the same stability design defects as the Bronco II. It 
was also evidence that could establish malice, fraud and oppression necessary for 
punitive damages. Ford knew that to increase a vehicle's stability, it needed to 
widen the vehicle's track width and lower the center of gravity. The Wilsons 
presented evidence that Ford engineers requested such changes in the Explorer's 
22
 The case was remanded in light of Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 
, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 166 L. Ed. 2d 940 (2007) as to punitive damages only. The 
judgment in the case was reaffirmed by the California State Court of Appeal on March 
10, 2008. [See Addendum 82 {Buell-Wilson v. Ford Motor Co. Cal. App. 4th 
(Cal. Ct. App. filed 3/10/08) "Buell-Wilson IF').] 
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design, but those were rejected. The Explorer's center of gravity, track width and 
SI (stability index) were substantially similar to the Bronco II. 
In appellants' case, the trial court only permitted their expert to testify about 
Exhibit 118 [Addendum 44] to demonstrate the Explorer was failing Ford's accident 
avoidance maneuver test. (R. 11476,R.T. 1/23/07, pp. 155-156 [Addendum 5].) 
Ford's test, was performed after the Clayton Explorer was manufactured, not 
before, and was not probative evidence of knowledge of the defective design before the 
Explorer was manufactured and sold. 
Appellants' engineering expert, David Ingebretsen, testified a failed J-Turn test 
means, "they experience a simultaneous two-wheel lift, which means that they have the 
two inside wheels [come] up off the ground." (R. 11476, R.T. 1/23/07, p. 156 [Addendum 
5].) Ingebretsen discussed ADAMS, Ford's computer modeling, which Ford employed to 
pass its rollover tests. Exhibit 118 showed the Explorer failing the J-Tum test. (A failed 
test means the vehicle is more likely to rollover.) The initial vehicle weight input was 
5,440 pounds, but Ford engineers adjusted the computer model by 20 pounds so the 
Explorer could "pass" its safety test. (R. 11476, R.T. 1/23/07, p. 159 [Addendum 5].) 
A twenty pound change in the computer modeling made the difference whether the 
Explorer passed or failed Ford's test. (R. 11476, R.T. 1/23/07, p. 159 [Addendum 5].) The 
size of a small child or a bag of groceries. Ingebretsen was asked what that meant from an 
engineering standpoint: 
To me it's saying that with very subtle changes, they're going from a fail to a pass. 
Changing one parameter by 20 pounds. And that tells me that there's something 
that is right on the very edge when it's running the gross vehicle weight, which is 
something that the vehicle is capable of doing. You can load that vehicle to that 
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weight, that's what "gross vehicle weight rating" means. Adding another 20 
pounds means that you don't pass their safety test. (Emphasis added; R. 11476, 
R.T. 1/23/07, p. 159 [Addendum 5].) 
Mr. Ingebretsen further testified the center of gravity on the Explorer changes 
depending on the tire size. (R. 11461, R.T. 1/17/07, pp. 181-182, 186, 187 [Addendum 3]; 
R. 11463, R.T. 1/19/07, p. 89 [Addendum 9].) 
The trial court's decision mid-trial affected appellants's substantial rights. See, 
Turner v. Nelson, 872 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1994) Ford's counsel capitalized on the 
court's ruling by then arguing to the jury: 
We talked about their [Ford's] design process. About establishing the mission. 
Setting the targets. You got to select the dimensions. You have to build and 
rebuild prototypes. And that's what Ford does. And then they test those 
prototypes. And then they go back to design. And they do this loop back and forth. 
And they don't release it until it meets their own guidelines and their own standards. 
And they have standards far above what any governmental agency requires of them. 
Particularly in rollover resistance. And they confirm design intent by these testings. 
And so here's, here's a summary of what we learned, I think from Mr. Tandy. The 
Explorer is a compact SUV. It's built on a truck chassis. It's required to have a 
higher CG to be able to get off road. To be sure that it had high rollover resistance. 
Ford designed it to pass track testing, the J-turn testing, the ADAMS model. And 
Ford is the only manufacturer that makes itself do that... Defendant's Exhibit 938, 
Ford's resistance to rollover guidelines. Not required. Nobody makes them do this. 
They impose it on themselves. They won't let the vehicle out to the public unless it 
passes. They do the ADAMS J-turn simulation. It's correlated to on track testing. 
They use the computer model so that they can do very quick design changes, test 
many different parameters, do thousands of configurations in a single day...But then 
there was the allegation, Well, they just do the model and they don't, they don't 
correlate. That's false. We brought in Mr. Tandy, the guy that did the work. 
Here's the exhibits. They're in evidence, okay? Didn't ask him [Mr. Tandy who 
was Ford's witness] about his work. Didn't ask him about anything having to do 
with these tests. Why? Because they know the work was done. They know the 
tests were done..." (Emphasis added. R. 11483, R.T. 2/9/07 p.m., pp. 69, 70, 71-72 
[Addendum 12].) 
41 
Ford's counsel also argued: 
This isn't the (sic) Mr. Ingebretsen style: Trust me. These are my words. But I don't 
need to do tests, [f] We believe you do have to do tests if you want to prove 
something. Ford did that as they were designing the vehicle. They've done it 
afterward. It is not sensitive to this 235 versus 255 tire. It is not some 20 pounds in 
the simulation makes a difference. That isn't the truth. (Emphasis added; R. 
11483, R.T. 2/9/07 p.m., p. 72 [Addendum 12].) 
The jury was never allowed to hear the truth because of the court's ruling. The 
Clayton Explorer was sold with P-235 tires. (R. 11459, R.T. [Clayton] p. 16 [Addendum 
10].) Ford's expert witness, Donald Tandy, was aware of a new Modeling policy dated 
September 6, 1990. (Trial Exhibit 66 (excluded) [Addendum 45 - Supplier "Judgments" 
of ADAMS output are to be discussed verbally rather than written.]) Ford was aware the 
Explorer was not passing its safety tests with P-235 tires on it. (See Trial Exhibit 65 
(excluded) [Addendum 35-1 believe that management is aware of the potential risk 
w/P235 tires and has accepted the risk.].) 
The error was not inconsequential. The jury was instructed with Jury Instruction 
No. 22 which required it to find the defective condition "at the time the product was sold 
by the manufacturer..." (R. 10574 [Addendum 75].) Appellants were deprived of 
presenting probative evidence that Ford knew of the Explorer's failed stability before the 
Clayton Explorer was manufactured and that Ford engineer's proposed a safer, alternative 
design as instructed under Jury Instruction No. 23. (R. 10575 [Addendum 75].) This error 
requires reversal of the judgment and a new trial. 
/ / / 
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POINT VII 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY EXCLUDING FORD'S KNOWLEDGE 
OF PRIOR DESIGN DEFECT AND THEN DIRECTING A VERDICT IN 
FORD'S FAVOR ON THE FRAUD ISSUE 
The Record, Appellants' amended complaint alleges: 
...FORD conducted tests of the Explorer and its component parts. FORD also 
received reports and/or information from its employees, vendors, government 
agencies, lawyers and others, including without limitation, information about actual 
accidents, relating to the Explorer, its handling and its propensity to roll and cause 
injuries to its occupants. From this information, FORD learned about the defects 
complained of herein. Yet, despite this knowledge, FORD omitted to disclose to the 
plaintiffs and the rest of the buying public that the Explorer was defective and 
prone to lose control and roll over under normal driving conditions... (R. 731, 
Amended Complaint, Tf 52, emphasis added. [Addendum 1].) 
As a result of FORD5s knowledge of these defects and the danger to occupants 
posed thereby, all of FORD's advertising which omitted to disclose these material 
facts was fraudulent and intentionally designed to lull the plaintiffs and the rest of 
the buying public into a false sense of security so that FORD could continue to sell 
massive numbers of Explorer vehicles. (R. 731-732, Amended Complaint, f 53, 
emphasis added [Addendum 1].) 
FORD's conduct constitutes fraud.... (R. 732, Amended Complaint, |^ 54 
[Addendum 1].) 
Just minutes before appellants' marketing/advertising expert, O.C. Ferrell, was 
allowed to testify, Ford convinced the court to exclude Exhibits 2 and 3, video 
presentations of Ford's national television commercials, and Exhibit 482G, information 
released by the State of Utah Attorney General's Office regarding marketing fraud 
allegations on the Ford Explorer. (R. 11488, Partial R.T. pp. 25-26 [Addendums 46, 81].) 
Appellants made an offer of proof that the commercials were relevant as follows: 
The testimony is as a proffer that the statements are made by the advertisers that 
expect it to be relied upon by the consuming public, and that the consuming public, 
based on that presumption, is expected to have seen it. And if they buy something, 
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it's expected that they relied on it. So Ford makes the advertising and expects the 
consumers to go out and buy the product. (R. 11488, R.T. p. 29-30 [Addendum 
44].) 
Appellants sought to introduce evidence through O.C. Ferrell, PhD, that the State of 
Utah Attorney General shared the opinion that Ford falsely advertised the Explorer with 
"car like" steering and handling, when the SUV prone and had a higher risk to rollover 
with the aftermarket size tires. [Addendum 81.] Indeed, the Attorneys General of fifty 
states and two territories held the same opinion. 
Appellants were allowed to present two exhibits. Ford's implied safety statements 
made public in the 1997 Explorer brochure, and Ford's "built tough" advertising 
statement. Mr. Ferrell testified the family photographs, images and words in the brochure, 
conveyed to the consumer that the Explorer was safe for family driving, and sturdy enough 
to go off road. The brochure, from a marketing perspective, conveyed to the average 
consumer that Ford did everything in its power to engineer a "safe" vehicle including 
building strong doors, and that the Explorer could navigate difficult situations. (R. 11458, 
R.T. 1/25/07, p.m., [Ferrell] pp. 14, 17, 18, 19, 21-22, 23, 24, 25, 29, 30 [Addendum 47].) 
Even though Ford offered no contra-evidence, after Mr. Ferrell testified, the court 
took the issue away from the trier-of-fact, and granted a directed verdict in Ford's favor on 
the fraudulent marketing/advertising issue. (R. 10041-10172, 10241.) 
Argument. A directed verdict requires no question of material fact exist. Nay v. 
General Motors Corp,, GMC Truck Div., supra, 850 P.2d 1260, 1261, 1264. 
Under Utah law, to bring a claim sounding in fraud, a party must allege (1) that a 
representation was made (2) concerning a presently existing material fact (3) which 
was false and (4) which the representor either (a) knew to be false or (b) made 
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recklessly, knowing that there was insufficient knowledge upon which to base such a 
representation, (5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it and (6) 
that the other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity, (7) did in fact 
rely upon it (8) and was thereby induced to act (9) to that party's injury and damage. 
Gold Standard v. Getty Oil Co., 915 P.2d 1060, 1066-1067 (Utah 1996) 
Here, even without the excluded exhibits, there was a triable issue of reliance that 
should have gone to the jury. See, Berkeley Bank for Coops, v. Meibos, 607 P.2d 798, 801 
(Utah 1980) ["It is also for the jury to determine whether the representations were of such a 
character and made under such circumstances that they were likely to deceive..."]. 
Tony's father testified that he went to the dealership with his son and purchased the 
1997 Explorer. Mr. Clayton viewed a 1997 Explorer sales brochure before he purchased 
the Explorer. (R. 11459, R.T. 1/9/07 [Clayton] p. 10, 11, 50-51 [Addendum 10].) Both 
Fred Clayton and Tony watched national television ads which also led up to the decision to 
purchase the 1997 Explorer. (R. 11459, R.T. 1/9/07 [Clayton] p. 13 [Addendum 10].) 
Tony's father specifically recalled Ford's advertising "Built Ford Tough." {Ibid.) 
Appellants' engineering expert testified the Explorer's tire size lifted the center of 
gravity and made the SUV even more unstable; the larger tire size added to the instability 
of the Clayton Explorer. (R. 11463, P..T. 1/19/07, pp. 89-90 [Addendum 9].) The error 
was exacerbated by the fact appellants were precluded from presenting evidence that the 
Explorer was failing Ford's own safety segment testing with P-235 tires, and that Ford's 
management knew of the failed stability tests and accepted the inherent instability risk by 
selling the SUV with oversized tires. (See POINT VI, supra.) 
The brochure advertising conveyed that the Explorer was engineered safely, not 
marginally stable. Consequently, the court erred both in directing a verdict, and in 
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excluding relevant engineering and advertising evidence which would have further 
supported a finding of Ford's marketing fraud as to the Explorer's safety and stability. 
The court also erred in its basis for excluding important fraud in advertisement 
evidence because it believed that Utah law required that appellants identify the precise 
advertising the Claytons watched on television. (R. 11488, Partial R.T. p. 30 [Addendums 
46].) Ford's counsel's argument on this point invited error. R. 11488, Partial R.T. p. 10 
[Addendums 46].) Fraud includes both actual and constructive fraud, i.e., fraudulent 
concealment. The fraud alleged in the amended complaint also constitutes constructive 
fraudulent concealment. As emphasized, appellants' alleged that FORD intentionally failed 
to disclose to the plaintiffs, and the rest of the buying public, that the Explorer was prone to 
lose control and roll over under normal driving conditions with oversized tires. (R. 717-
735, Amended Complaint, ^ 52 [Addendum 1].) 
Fraudulent concealment consists of (1) nondisclosed material information, (2) 
known to the party who fails to disclose, and (3) is a legal duty to communicate. Yazd v. 
Woodside Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47, P10 [143 P.3d 283] (Utah 2006). When Mr. Clayton 
and his son bought the Explorer, the Ford salesman did not explain or disclose to them that 
the Explorer XLT should not be sold with P235 tires. (R. 11459, R.T. 1/9/07 [Clayton] p. 
16 [Addendum 10].) 
In Buell-Wilson v. Ford Motor Co. Cal. App. 4th (Cal. Ct. App. filed 
3/10/08), the appellate court identified Ford's marketing fraud as follows: 
The Explorer's instability was increased by Ford's management's decision to utilize 
-235 tires that further raised the center of gravity, instead of the P215 tires specified 
and request by its engineers to provide greater stability. [Addendum 82, Opn, p. 17.] 
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Instead of using smaller tires, Ford executives decided in February 1989 to under 
inflate the P235 and P245 tires to 26 pounds per square inch (psi) as opposed to the 
tire's specification of 35 psi. Explorer owners were not informed of the need to 
under inflate the tires, nor were they told they were exposed to the risk of a rollover 
by complying with the tire's higher inflation specifications. [Addendum 82, Opn, p. 
19.] 
Ford sold the Clayton Explorer with P-235 tires without disclosing that the size of 
the tires made the SUV unstable in routine freeway driving conditions. (See Exhibit P-5 
[Addendum 27].) Because appellants' engineer, Mr. Ingebretsen testified the center of 
gravity on the Explorer changes depending on the tire size (R. 11461, R.T. 1/17/07, pp. 
181-182, 186, 187 [Addendum 3]; R. 11463, R.T. 1/19/07, p. 89 [Addendum 9]), it was 
error to grant a directed verdict. This error occurred and was compounded because 
appellants were precluded from presenting many relevant engineering documents showing 
the SUV's stability was tied to its tire size. (See Argument VI, supra.) 
POINT VIII 
THE TRIAL COURT'S REMARKS AND ACTIONS, TAKEN AS A WHOLE, 
INDUCED THE JURY INTO A QUICK UNREASONED VERDICT 
The Record. On Friday Febmary 9, 2007, a week before closing arguments, the 
trial court informed the jury it would not begin deliberations on a week-end. (R. 11487, 
R.T. 2/1/07 (End of Day) p. 2 [Addendum 16].) The court said: 
[You will not] have contact with the outside world as it were. There won't be any 
telephones. We'll take your cell phones just to make certain that, we'll hold your 
cell phones. And you'll be in the jury room deliberating for as long as it takes to, in 
terms of a verdict. 
Thereafter, contrary to his promise, the court urged counsel to conclude arguments 
on Friday, February 9, 2007. During closing arguments, the court asked the jury if it would 
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sit through lunch break. (R. 11483, R.T. 2/9/07, p.m., p. 3 [Addendum 12].) Then, during a 
quick recess, but before closing arguments were completed, the trial court, 
without inquiring whether anyone needed to eat, told the jurors to make calls to their loved 
ones. The trial court said: 
I should tell you, this will be your last break before you become a sequestered jury. 
And as I told you before, what that means is that we'll not allow contact with the 
outside world. So if there's phone calls that need to be made and those sort of 
things, now would be the time to do that. (Emphasis added; R. 11483, R.T. 2/9/07, 
p.m., p. 84 [Addendum 12].) 
With the court's remarks in mind, the jury was sequestered around 3:30 p.m. without 
a lunch break and began deliberating on complex engineering issues. Since the jury had 
been in court since 9:00 a.m., it is reasonable to assume the jury had not eaten for at least 
ten hours. Deliberating takes energy; however, the jury was not allowed to eat until around 
7:00 p.m., when it was fed a pizza. Thereafter, the jury sent the court a note asking to 
examine the full scale front suspension and the door exhibits which remained inside the 
courtroom. At 7:45 p.m., the jury was brought back into the courtroom and instructed to 
examine the evidence for only five to seven minutes. (R. 11483, R.T. 2/9/07, p.m., pp. 124-
125 [Addendum 12].) 
Less then two hours later, the jury reached its 6-2 verdict. Appellants moved for a 
new trial arguing the jury was coerced into a hasty verdict, which the court denied. (R. 
10949-11022; R. 11226-11228 [Addendum 50 Excerpt]; R. 11236-11344; R. 11372-11378 
[Addendum 17].) 
Argument. A judge should not coerce a jury into returning a verdict because this 
amounts to an unfair trial and a denial of due process. Mills v. Tinsley, 314 F.2d 311,313 
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(10th Cir. 1963). / This is an issue of first impression in a civil case in Utah. Claims of 
coerced verdicts should be examined on a case-by-case basis. In determining whether a 
verdict was coerced, all of the circumstances, as well as the particular language used by the 
trial judge, and inferences drawn from the court's remarks should be considered. People v. 
Malone, 180 Mich. App. 347, 352 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989). In People v. Malone, supra, 180 
Mich. App. 347, the Michigan appellate court reversed. The court reasoned: 
While we do not believe that the trial court was attempting to coerce a verdict, we 
are constrained to agree with defendant that the effect of the trial court's comments 
to the jury may have been a coerced verdict. In light of the fact that the jury was 
never told that it could resume deliberations on the following Monday, we believe 
that the trial court's comments, taken as a whole, at best were confusing and may 
have improperly communicated by implication that, if a verdict could not be reached 
that evening, the jury would be considered deadlocked and would be permanently 
discharged. (Id. at p. 353; emphasis added.) 
Under ABA standards for criminal cases, a court may charge the jury to continue 
their deliberations and may give or repeat a jury instruction but should not require the jury 
to deliberate for an unreasonable length of time or unreasonable intervals. State v. Lamb, 
44 N.C. App. 251, 255-256 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979); See, ABA Standard 15-5.4 (b). 
Although this is a civil case, it does not relieve the trial court of its corresponding 
responsibility to assure careful and meaningful deliberation of contested issues and 
evidence. Concepts of due process involve civil court trials as well. Brief deliberations 
invite an inference the court's remarks and actions were the primary factor in the 
23
 In Mills v. Tinsley, supra, 314 F.2d 311, involving a criminal murder trial, the 
Tenth Circuit found after examining all of the circumstances, that it did not present an 
unusual situation because the jury deliberated for over 31 hours and was presumably 
allowed to take time away from deliberations for eating and sleeping. (Id. at p. 313.) 
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procurement of the verdict. See, People v. Branch, 123 111. App. 3d 245, 252 [462 N.E.2d 
868] (111. App. Ct. 1984). 
In appellants' case, the jury began deliberations without eating all day. They were 
never told they could take time away from deliberations to go home to their families. The 
implication was that the jury would not be able to go home or communicate with the 
outside world until they reached a verdict. It continued during deliberations when the jury 
did not have a break to eat until around 7:00 p.m. The coercion continued when the jurors 
were instructed they had only five to seven minutes to examine evidence. The subliminal 
message was to hurry-up. Less than two hours later, a verdict was reached. Fatigued, the 
jury was rushed out of the courtroom, not even understanding the special verdict polling 
process. (R. 11483, R.T. p.m., p. 128 [Addendum 12]; R. 11395 [Addendum 2].) 
Appellants were prejudiced. The parties spent several weeks presenting complex 
engineering defect issues. The number of expert engineers, lay witnesses, and the number 
of trial exhibits24/, the jury instructions and alternative theories of product liability issues, 
should have warranted extended deliberations in the case. The court's remarks gave the 
jury a perception that the job must get done quickly and they could not go home until the 
job was done. The coerced jury's verdict should constitute an irregularity in the 
proceedings. Utah R. Civ. P. 59 (a)(1). This was a clear abuse of the trial court's 
discretion. 
There were over 280 exhibits presented by both sides. [Addendum 18] 
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POINT IX 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE QUESTIONED JUROR NO. 3 
FURTHER ABOUT HIS INABILITY TO REMAIN IMPARTIAL INSTEAD 
OF LEAVING A PRESUMABLY BIASED JUROR ON THE JURY 
The Record. Juror No. 3 was an engineer who owned his own engineering 
company. (R. 11468, R.T. 1/2/07 a.m.5 pp. 27-28 [Addendum 13].) 
On January 5, 2007, Juror No. 3 advised the court he was unhappy serving on the 
jury. In response, appellants' counsel informed the court: "I think an unhappy juror is not 
good for any of us." 
Instead of questioning Juror No. 3 further as appellants' counsel asked, the trial 
court stated that Juror No. 3 would not be excused unless both parties stipulated to the 
juror's release. (R. 11472, R.T. 1/5/07 a.m., pp. 3, 4, 5-6 [Addendum 14].) 
Five days later, and four weeks before the trial concluded, the bailiff overheard Juror 
No. 3 tell jurors that he had already made up his mind about the case saying "You guys 
know what I think already." (R. 11466, R.T. 1/10/07 p.m., pp. 3-4 [Addendum 15].) 
The bailiff further reported Juror No. 3 thought that everyone was being too open minded. 
Appellants' counsel again asked that Juror No. 3 be examined. However, the trial court 
declined failing to insure the juror was not biased. (R. 11466, R.T. 1/10/07 p.m., pp. 4-5 
[Addendum 15].) 
Argument. Utah R. Civ. P. 47 (a) states the court shall permit the attorneys to 
supplement the examination of jurors by such further inquiry as is material and proper. 
Here, the trial court refused to make inquiry to determine the extent of the Juror No. 3's 
bias. A motion for mistrial would have been futile as the court had already made up its 
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mind that the juror would not be dismissed. Here, the plain error rule should apply. See, 
State v. King, 2006 UT 3, P20 [131 P.3d 202] (Utah 2006). 
Utah R. Civ. P. 47(f)(6) directs the trial court to remove a juror when conduct, 
responses, state of mind or other circumstances reasonably lead the court to conclude the 
juror is not likely to act impartially. 
The bailiff was concerned with the juror's bias based on statements he overheard the 
juror make to other jurors. It was the trial court's duty to make a legal determination as to 
whether Juror No. 3 had the ability to remain impartial. See, State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86, 
P49 [55 P.3d 573] (Utah 2002). In these circumstances, a trial court has a sua sponte duty 
to further investigate or remove the juror if he or she has expressed a bias as to inevitably 
taint the trial process. State v. King, supra, UT 3, P19; see also Utah R. Civ. P. 47(f)(1). 
In State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, P36 [992 P.2d 951] (Utah 1999) the Utah 
Supreme Court held: 
We now make emphatically clear that a juror's statement alone that he or she can 
decide a case fairly pursuant to the law given by the trial court is not a sufficient 
basis for qualifying a juror to sit when the prospective juror's answers provide 
evidence of possible bias and the trial court does not allow further questions 
designed to probe the extent and the depth of the bias. Preventing such further 
inquiry and concluding the issue by taking a juror's conclusory statement that he or 
she will not be affected by a particular attitude or will decide the case fairly is not 
sufficient. (Emphasis added.) 
Similarly, in appellants' case, the trial court refused to question the juror further, 
therefore the presumption of bias which was reported by the bailiff was not overcome. See 
West v. Holley, 2004 UT 97, P15 [103 P.3d 708] (Utah 2004) (The trial court erred in 
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failing to remove a juror for cause despite the juror's opinion that she was capable of 
deciding the case on its merits). The purpose of questioning is to probe bias. 
The error in not questioning Juror No. 3 was not harmless or inconsequential. There 
is a reasonable likelihood the court's failure to assure the juror was not biased affected the 
jury's verdict. Juror No. 3 was an engineer and he could use that fact to convince non-
technical jurors of the facts due to his bias. Even though the jury was admonished to 
remain open-minded, if Juror No. 3 had already made up his mind, he would not have 
listened to the engineering testimony with an open mind. Significantly, this juror had the 
ability to persuade the entire jury of the rightness of his conviction. 
Accordingly, the trial court committed plain error in not questioning a presumptively 
biased juror and allowing him to remain on the jury. 
X 
THE TRIAL COURT CAUSED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BECAUSE IT 
LET FORD PRESENT STATISTICAL EVIDENCE OF OTHER VEHICLE 
ROLLOVERS 
The Record. Prior to trial, appellants moved to exclude Ford's accident 
reconstruction expert from presenting statistical evidence that the severity of the Clayton 
rollover crash exceeded more than 99 percent of all rollovers, citing Utah R. Evidence 
Rules 401,402, 403 and 702. (R. 7647-7657, [Addendum 19].) The trial court denied 
appellants' motion. (R. 9591 [Addendum 21].) 
Ford's expert testified that Tony's rollover was in the 99.9 percentile of all rollovers. 
(R. 11462, pp. 112-114 [Addendum 20].) The jury was also shown a chart, 
Defendant's Exhibit D-347-2 with statistics comprised from all different kinds of vehicles 
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over appellants' objection. [Addendum 18, Exhibit D-437-2 "chart on rollover severity"].) 
Argument. Ford's expert derived his "statistical" opinion from other accident 
evidence which included light trucks, SUVs, vans, pickup trucks and passenger cars. (R. 
11452, R.T. 112 [Addendum 20].) In Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co., 781 P.2d 445, 449 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) the court ruled that "other" accident evidence did not meet the 
substantially similar circumstances to permit admissibility. 
Ford presented NO evidence that the other vehicles were significantly similar to the 
Explorer's design or that the circumstances and causes of the other vehicle rollovers were 
substantially the same. The "statistical" testimony had no probative value as to 
causation.25/ Probabilities cannot establish that a single event did or did not occur. Statistics 
are particularly inappropriate when used to establish facts not susceptible to quantitative 
analysis. See, e.g., People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33, 40-41 (Cal. 1968). Even where 
statistically valid probability evidence has been presented courts have routinely excluded it 
when the evidence invites the jury to focus upon a seemingly scientific, numerical 
conclusion rather than to analyze the actual evidence before it. State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 
498, 501 (Utah 1986). 
The error was not harmless or inconsequential. The statistical evidence had the 
25
 An integral element of Rule 702 is balancing the probative value of the evidence 
against its potential for unfair prejudice. Haupt v. Heaps, 2005 UT App 436, P 25 [131 
P.3d 252] (Utah Ct. App. 2005). Where the probative value is not great, the evidence 
should be excluded. Cf, Terry v. Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., supra, 605 P.2d 314, 323. 
If the evidence only supports conjectural inferences, it only serves to mislead the jury, 
Pearce v. Wistisen, 701 P.2d 489, 491-492 (Utah 1985) citations omitted, and should be 
excluded. 
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potential to confuse and mislead the jury. Indeed, Ford relied upon the seemingly 
"scientific" evidence and asked the jury to focus on the fallacious numerical conclusion: 
... And, amd the second point; again, has to do with the severity of this accident. And 
you've seen these charts. This is Defendant's Exhibit 436 (sic). And what does it 
mean? Okay? It means that in this Clayton accident we're at 16 quarter turns. And 
therefore it is worse, as measured by quarter turns, than 99.9 percent of the 
accidents. And again, I think I've heard some criticism, Oh, statistics don't tell you 
what happened. You can look at that chart and see exactly what happened. They 
were in one of the worst accidents in rollovers that are studied in the country. 
Ninety-nine point nine percent are less severe. (Emphasis added; R. 11483, R.T. 
2/9/07, p.m., pp. 47-48 [Addendum 12].) 
There is a reasonable probability the error affected the outcome of the trial. Larsen 
v. Johnson, supra, 958 P.2d 953, 958. The jury was invited to analyze the chart and 
statistical evidence to see "exactly what happened." Based on the statistical evidence, the 
jury could have well concluded that appellants had not met their burden of proof. The 
admission of this evidence was an error as a matter of law. Therefore, reversal is required. 
POINT XI 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING TROOPER PACE TO 
SPECULATE AND GIVE EXPERT OPINION TESTIMONY ON 
CAUSATION BASED ON HIS SUPERFICIAL ACCIDENT 
INVESTIGATION 
The Record. In opposition to Ford's summary judgment motion, appellants 
objected to hearsay opinions in the accident report. (R. 5390-5398; R. 6456-6470.) The 
trial court ruled the report was admissible under Evid. Rule 803, (8) (C)26/. The court also 
ruled Trooper Pace had personal knowledge of the scene and advanced training in accident 
26
 803(8) (C) permits "factual findings resulting from an investigation...unless the 
sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness." 
55 
investigation, and therefore could offer his expert opinion testimony. (R. 6555 [Addendum 
22].) 
Prior to trial, appellants again moved to exclude Pace's speculative and cumulative 
opinion testimony as to whether Tony was wearing a seat belt; whether Tony was asleep or 
otherwise inattentive. (R. 7934-7947 [Addendum 23] see also 7798, 7801-7803 [Addendum 
24].) The motions were denied. (R. 9593-9594 [Addendum 21].) 
Ford called Trooper Pace who testified about his training and experience as a police 
officer. Pace told the jury the rollover was caused either because Tony's was inattentive or 
asleep. He further testified Tony was not seat belted. Trooper Pace did not interview the 
eyewitness to the rollover, Mr. Cantu. (R. 11479, R.T. 1/30/07, pp. 13, 14-15, 20, 27, 28, 
47, 48, 51, 52, 54-56 [Addendum 6].) 
On cross-examination, Trooper Pace testified he reported Tony "speeding" because 
Tony was "asleep," and that in his opinion, any type of speed was too fast, when the driver 
was sleeping. Pace had no independent recollection of th investigation. He acknowledged 
that sometimes seatbelts do not latch, but he did not consider that possibility. Trooper Pace 
conceded he had no basis to conclude Tony was asleep or inattentive other than the fact the 
Explorer left the road. Pace did not know where the highway permanent marker was from 
which the accident measurements were taken. He did not know how far apart the rumble 
strips were. He acknowledged the police diagram should have had ABCD markers, but did 
not. Trooper Pace did not recall inspecting the Explorer for contraband, or how the 
Explorer's tires blew out. He did not recall examining the Explorer's four-wheel drive 
control track system, and did not recall whether any effort 
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was made to inventory the debris at the scene or in the median. Pace did not investigate 
why the Explorer's right front wheel was turned completely to the left, while the left wheel 
pointed straight ahead, and he did not know the tie rod had broken in the middle, as 
opposed to one end. (R. 11479, R.T. 1/30/07, pp. 45-46, 52, 62, 64, 66, 68, 70, 71-72, 77, 
87, 90, 92 [Addendum 6].) 
Based on the above testimony, appellants moved to strike Pace's speculative 
causation opinion testimony, but their motion was denied. (R. 11479, R.T. 1/30/07, p. 94 
[Addendum 6].) Thereafter, appellants moved for a new trial arguing Trooper Pace's 
causation opinion bolstered Ford's accident reconstruction expert's testimony and was 
highly prejudicial. (R. 10950, 10962 [Addendum 50]; see also, R. 11244-11247.) 
Appellants' motion was denied. (R. 11375 [Addendum 17].) 
Argument. Under Utah R. Evid. 602, a witness may testify only to matters of which 
he has personal knowledge. State v. Powell, 2007 UT 9, P51 [154 P.3d 788] (Utah 2007). 
A witness who is not an expert may offer opinion testimony only when it is rationally based 
on the witness's perception and helpful to a clear understanding of the determination of a 
fact in issue. (Utah R. Evid. 701.) A witness qualified as an expert may testify if scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge assists the trier of fact to understand the evidence 
or to determine a fact in issue. (Utah R. Evid. 702.) Even if the witness may offer an 
"opinion" based on his or her perception and experience, the witness's testimony is also 
subject to Utah R. Evid. 403 and therefore cannot be speculative, cumulative or prejudicial. 
Ford designated Geoffrey Germane, an engineer accident reconstruction expert who 
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investigated and testified regarding the cause of the rollover.2/ Ford's engineer investigated 
the scene, examined the damaged Ford Explorer, took numerous photographs of the 
vehicle, and took into consideration the design of the Explorer's front suspension before 
offering his expert opinion on causation. 
Ford also called another engineer, Michael James, who examined the vehicle, took 
photographs and testified about the condition of the seatbelt. (R. 7801, 10247.) 
Trooper Pace's opinions on causation bolstered Ford's other experts' theories on 
causation.28/ Objective facts are one thing, conclusions are something else entirely. The 
conclusions drawn by the scene officer were not based on actual perception, and were not 
based on a thorough investigation. An opinion is only as good as the foundation on which it 
is based. Officer Pace's opinion should have been excluded. As emphasized, Trooper Pace 
did not thoroughly inspect for broken parts or photograph the front suspension or the inside 
of the Explorer. Therefore, his conclusion that Tony was asleep or inattentive because the 
Explorer left the road was obviously a conclusion based on speculation. 
Evidence Rule 403 requires the trial court to exclude evidence if its probative value 
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Martin v. Safeway Stores, 
Inc., Utah, 565 P.2d 1139 (1977). Even if evidence is relevant, it should be excluded when 
27
 Immediately after Trooper Pace testified, Ford called its accident reconstruction 
expert Germane to testify. (R. 10299.) 
28
 This case is distinguishable from Randle v. Allen, supra, 862 P.2d 1329, 1337 
because Ford was allowed to present cumulative expert opinion on causation. As argued, 
the testimony was prejudicial because Trooper Pace was not a paid expert. His opinions 
had the potential to mislead the jury on the complex engineering causation issues. 
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it has the potential to mislead the jury. Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co., supra, 781 P.2d 445, 
449. Here the testimony had the potential to mislead the jury. The prejudice occurs 
because a police officer's testimony is often given greater respect and weight by the jury. 
In essence, the court's ruling allowed Ford to make Trooper Pace their own 
"expert." Ford elicited the following seat belt testimony: 
Q. And is whether or not the occupants are belted or not something that's 
indicated in your investigation report? 
A. It is. 
Q. And what did your investigation report indicate regarding the driver seat 
belt? 
A. In my report, it shows that [Tony] was not wearing a seat belt. 
(R. 11479, R.T. [Pace] 1/30/07, p. 48 [Addendum 6].) 
Trooper Pace's cumulative opinion as to whether Tony was wearing a seat belt 
should not be deemed harmless error. Tony's father testified it was Tony's custom and 
habit to wear his seat belt. There was evidence Tony was safety conscientious about the 
vehicle's seatbelts because he had the rear seat belt examined when it did not operate 
properly. (R. 11459, R.T. [Clayton] p. 22, 35, 79 [Addendum 10].) Appellant's 
engineering expert, David Ingebretsen, testified Tony's side latching seat belt came 
unlatched when Tony was upside down. Ingebretsen also observed a witness mark on the 
driver's seatbelt. (R. 11461, R.T. 1/17/07, pp. 25-26, 146-147 [Addendum 3].) 
Ford's counsel also elicited Trooper Pace's opinion on an ultimate issue - the cause 
of the rollover: 
59 
Q ...[I]n your experience, why would that occur during the day rather than at 
night as well? 
A They do occur at night also, but they also occur during the day. It's just dozy 
and warm and nice and radio going, and you just kind of drift asleep. You 
just nod off to sleep. 
Q And comparing this accident to your experience of other accidents that you 
have investigated with sleeping or inattentive drivers, does everything in this 
accident investigation seem consistent with an asleep driver? 
A It is very consistent with somebody being asleep. 
(R. 11479, R.T. [Pace] 1/30/07, pp. 55-56 [Addendum 6].) 
Ford then capitalized on Trooper Pace's expressed expertise urging the jury to give 
Pace's testimony and opinion greater weight since the officer had investigated thousands 
and thousands of accidents.29/ Ford argued: 
It was his [Pace's] job to figure out what happened in this accident. (R. 11483, R.T. 
2/9/07, p.m., p. 12 [Addendum 12].) 
This is an individual whose job it is to figure out what occurred. (R. 11483, R.T. 
2/9/07, p.m., p. 13 [Addendum 12].) 
This isn't a paid expert. This is the guy whose job it was to understand what 
happened. (R. 11483, R.T. 2/9/07, p.m., p. 14 [Addendum 12].) 
Let's go through the evidence you've heard. First of all with Officer Pace. He did 
an investigation../[He] determined if you do not make any type of vehicle maneuver 
and keep going right straight, you would run off the road at exactly the spot just 
about every time. The same spot that road.' That's why that curve's significant. It 
isn't just happenstance. It's inattention...He's studied it. He's investigated it. 
"Trooper Pace, after completing your investigation and completing your report, can 
you tell us your general conclusion?' He says: 'My general conclusion is the driver 
was asleep or inattentive. He was either picking something up, ran off the road to 
29
 It would have been futile to further object in closing argument. The trial court 
previously overruled all of appellants' objections and would have overruled any objection 
to Ford's closing argument since it was based on the previously admitted testimony. 
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the left, overcorrected back to the right, overcorrected back to the left.' Okay? This 
isn't a paid expert. This is the man on the scene that day. Trying to understand what 
happened...Inattentive. Off the road. Asleep.... (Emphasis added; R. 11483, R.T. 
2/9/07 p.m., pp. 17-18 [Addendum 12].) 
Officer Pace again: 'You have training about inattentiveness or asleep?' This isn't 
guess. He says: 'Yes. We're given training. We're taught to understand when you 
can perceive that happened and when not.' It's part of his training. And then he was 
asked: "Comparing this accident to other accidents, is this consistent with sleeping 
and inattentiveness?' And he says: 'Yes, very consistent.' And then we talked about 
- a little bit about his accident report, where he determines that it was a prime 
contributor that he was asleep or inattentive... So now we've covered Officer Pace. 
Not a paid expert.... (Emphasis added; R. 11483, R.T. 2/9/07, p.m., pp. 18-19 
[Addendum 12].) 
Ford also profited from Trooper Pace's testimony regarding the debris at the scene: 
...I'm showing you Dr. (sic) Pace's testimony. Did anybody inventory the debris? 
'No. I don't think we did that.' Concerning all of your training and, and, and so 
forth, is it typical at the accident scene to inventory the debris? 'No, not really. The 
wrecker drivers kind of do it, generally speaking.' [If] Okay? And so let's just kind 
of conclude now on this tie rod. The evidence on that 23-17 and all of the other 
photographs from the police, show no two wheel lift. And that means the tie rod had 
to be cormected... (Emphasis added; R. 11483, R.T. 2/9/07, p.m., p. 47 [Addendum 
12].) 
Pace's opinion testimony was based on a superficial investigation. It was not helpful 
to the jury's determination of the ultimate issues. Yet, the jury was asked to, and likely 
gave great weight and respect to Trooper Pace's opinion and ignored the eyewitness who 
observed two-wheel lift on the pavement immediately before the Explorer began 
rolling over. Admitting Pace's testimony was prejudicial and therefore was an error of law. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)(7). 
/ / / 
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POINT XII 
EVEN IF SOME ERRORS ARE DEEMED HARMLESS, THE JUDGMENT 
SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE OF CUMULATIVE ERROR 
The combination of evidentiary ruling errors and jury instruction errors constitutes 
cumulative error. Even if some of the errors committed during the course of the trial are 
deemed harmless individually, they were cumulatively harmful. Whitehead v. American 
Motors Sales Corp., supra, 801 P.2d 920, 928. In assessing cumulative error, a reviewing 
court considers all the identified errors, as well as any errors it assumes may have occurred. 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993). 
Here, the consequences of the cumulative error deprived appellants of a fair trial and 
requires reversal. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, appellants were denied a fair trial. The judgment below 
should be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial with instructions: 
That Ford be precluded from using comparative statistical evidence with dissimilar 
vehicles, i.e., different track width to center of gravity height ratios; 
That Ford be precluded from eliciting expert opinion testimony from Trooper Pace 
on causation; 
That Ford engineering design and advertising documents on the Bronco 
II/Explorer's testing, loading, alternative design be admissible; 
That due to Ford's first door latch expert's opinion, and Ford's fraud on the court, 
the door latch be deemed defective; or alternatively, that the lower court hold an evidentiary 
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hearing as to wheliier fraudulent e vidence was presented to the jury; 
That the Tiede report be admissible as a matter of law; 
That the trial court be instructed to use a verdict form that provides interrogatories to 
the jury on every issue presented for their deliberation; 
That Jury Instruct! urns Hi>. i t, '•() unil 3 I, nul be i^ uvuii, 
That the trial shall not be bifurcated; 
That the jury be given appropriate breaks, including time to eat and sleep. 
DATED AND SUBMITTED this Z ^ d a y of March, 
Thor O. Emblem 
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